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CHAPTER ONE 
INTRODUCTION 
The meaning of existence and the nature of truth were central 
to Ki erkegaardi an thought. Any discussion of Ki erkegaard' s thought 
would include various aspects of these themes. In every matter, 
whether it be Kierkegaard's ethics, the nature of the individual, the 
religious life, we are forced to consider these themes. 
In modern times existentialism has became popular. Yet the 
existentialism of Kierkegaard, the call to a difficult but ultimately 
rewarding life as an individual Christian, is not popular. Such a 
philosophy is not part of the contemporary "good-life Christianity" 
so commonly promoted. The camp 1 acency of the nineteenth century 
church has fallen again upon the twentieth century church. 
Ki erkegaard searched for meaning in existence and found it 
rested in becoming involved with one's own existence. Christianity, 
subjectively understood and existentially appropriated, supplied the 
existing believer with a focus for his existence. Appropriation must 
be a decision made by a solitary individual willing to give himself 
completely to the task of becoming. It was within this process of 
becoming that truth became known subjectively through the passion of 
inwardness. 
1. 
2. 
Justification of Study 
The fact that man needed to hear a message of cha 11 enge to 
become a Christi an was good reason for such a study. 
kegaard gave his life to delivering such a challenge. 
S0ren Ki er-
The need to 
hear such a challenge in Kierkegaard•s own inimitable way still 
remains. 
The understanding of how Kierkegaard viewed existence and 
truth were foundation a 1 to a more comp 1 ete understanding of Ki er-
kegaard. The meaning of existence cannot be determined outside of 
existence, thus Ki erkegaard 1 ooked to his own existence to discover 
the road to meaning. An existential analysis was unique, for it re-
quired the individual to look to his own existing circumstance rather 
than step outside and use speculative and abstract systems to measure 
one•s own existence. It was within this existence that one could find 
meaning for his existence and realize the truth by which his existence 
would be governed. Therefore existence and truth were the bedrock 
of Ki erkegaardi an thought and offered the opportunity of essent i a 1 
understanding.· The final result was not to draw one into the belief•s 
of a new system but to st i mu 1 ate one into the rea 1 i zat ion of a 
meaningful existence. The serious reader of Kierkegaard needs to come 
to an understanding of Kierkegaardian existence and truth. Kier-
kegaard would stimulate the same individual into the process of 
becoming whereby existence will become meaningful and truth will 
become evident. 
Phi 1 osophy should be concerned with making man • s existence 
3. 
more meaningful. Philosophy, as a discipline, is a task by which man 
can more clearly perceive his existential situation. If we do not 
know where we are, we cannot chart a course. Kierkegaard has provided 
us with a process by which we may discover where we are. He felt 
obligated to act as a midwife, bringing to birth our own innate ideas. 
We could find what we ought to be and what we ought to do, within our-
selves. The study of.Kierkegaard brought about understanding of Kier-
kegaardian existence and truth and one's own existence. 
Method of Procedure 
This study was largely descriptive in nature. It gave intro-
duction to two fundamental elements within S0ren Kierkegaard's 
thought. Of utmost importance was S0ren Ki erkegaard' s own thought 
as opposed to a discussion of the merits of his views. The primary 
focus was upon the nature of man and the meaning of his existence 
which culminated in S.K.'s expression. "truth is subjectivity." The 
existential nature of S.K. 's thought required brief biographical re-
ferences which are reflected in the deve 1 oping concepts. The study 
did not follow a particular historical outline but reflected several 
period's of S.K.'s life. The design of the study focused upon the 
centra 1 themes of existence· and truth and fo 11 owed a 1 ogi ca 1 con-
ceptual pattern rather than a historical sequence. 
Throughout the study S.K. has been allowed to speak for him-
self, without commentary. The debates and views of S.K.'s opponents 
were set aside so that the heart of S.K. 's message may be more clearly 
seen. While the study of S.K. 's reason for certain concepts and 
4. 
thoughts has occupied others, there was 1 itt 1 e attempt to show the 
roots of S. K. 's thought. We were not concerned with the "whence" but 
with the "what" and "why" of Kierkegaard's thought. 
Limitations of Study 
The study was limited by the selective nature of the study. 
Ki erkegaard' s thought· was permeated with existent i a 1 e 1 ements, but 
reflected a diversity of concerns. This study concentrated upon those 
works which spoke most directly to his existential view. Two fund-
amental areas of thought were arbitrarily selected from the whole of 
his work for closer scrutiny. Therefore the study was limited by its' 
inability to encompass the whole of S.K.'s thought, which would have 
been more true to Ki erkegaard, but much beyond the scope of this 
study. 
Design of Study 
The design of this study followed something of the logical 
development of concepts as observed within S.K. 's works. The second 
chapter provided a brief biographical sketch and laid out the 
historical context from which he spoke. This chapter permitted the 
reader to see some of the why of Kierkegarrd's thought. The meaning 
of existence and the nature of man were the themes of the third 
chapter. The stages of 1 i fe provided the framework by which the 
chapter was built. Included were Kierkegaard's ethical view and the 
place of aesthetics in existence. Chapter four gave voice to S.K.'s 
pivotal thesis, "truth is subjectivity." Here the pri nc i p 1 es of 
5. 
existence and the nature of man were applied and illustrated. 
Theological considerations such as faith, sin, passion and God were 
reflected upon. Chapter five closed the study with some final remarks 
concerning Kierkegaard•s contribution to contemporary thought and 
theo 1 ogy. Some observations regarding Ki erkegaard • s thought c 1 osed 
the study. 
CHAPTER TWO 
BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH 
Sl!lren Ki erkegaard, the 1 ast of seven chi 1 dren, was born to 
Ann and Michael Kierkegaard 1 on May 5, 1813. 2 The family resided in 
Copenhagen Denmark, where Sl!lren lived, did the bulk of his work and 
where he died. Sl!lren Ki erkegaard evidently 1 oved Copenhagen because 
he rarely left it. 3 Here he found his inspiration for writing, suf-
fered his pain and humiliation and began his attack upon established 
Christianity. He loved his country and his native tongue and 
exercised the utmost care in his use of it. 
Expressing thanks for the sympathy and good will as have 
been showed me, I could wish that I might, as it were, present 
these works {as I now take the liberty of doing) and commend 
them to the nation whose 1 anguage I am proud to have the 
honor of writing, feeling for it a filial devotion and an 
almost womanly tenderness, yet comforting myself also with 
the thought th~t it wi 11 not be disgraced for the fact that 
I have used it. 
1Walter Lowrie, A Short Life Of Kierkegaard {Princeton: Prin-
ceton University Press, 1942), p. 22. 
2Ibid., p. 3. 
3Ibid., p. 15. 
4 Ibid, p. 14. For a fuller appreciation of Sl!lren Kier-
kegaard's love for country and language, see pp. 9-16. 
6. 
7. 
A. Copenhagen 
The Copenhagen of the early 1800 1 s was a city of about two-
hundred thousand inhabitants. It was the capital of the little land 
and the cultural center of Denmark. 5 Here came all the prominent 
artistic and 1 i terary figures of Denmark, of which many figured in 
the life of S0ren Kierkegaard. 6 
Copenhagen was a quiet 1 itt 1 e town that st i 11 offered the 
benefits of a 1 arge city. It had not yet been struck by the in-
dustrial revolution and would not be until two years after S0ren Kier-
kegaard 1 s death. 7 Thus it was an o 1 d society, one that as yet had 
not been uprooted by the mood of change characterized by indus-
trialism. The society was conservative and traditional with its Guild 
system and Absolutism. 8 
S0ren Kierkegaard said the year in which he was born was "the 
year in which so many another bad note was put into circulation." 9 
It was the year of national bankruptcy after a six year war with 
England as an ally of Napoleon. Kierkegaard 1 S life spanned one of 
5E.J. Carnell, The Burden of S0ren Kierkegaard (Grand Rapids: 
Eerdmans, 1965), p. 25. 
6Lowrie, op cit., pp. 3-5. 
7Frederich Sontag, A Kierkegaard Handbook (Atlanta: John Knox 
Press, 1979), p. 1. 
8Ibid., p. 1. 
9
rbid.' p. 1. 
8. 
the poorest periods in Danish history. 10 
B. The Church 
S0ren Ki erkegaard be 1 onged to the Lutheran church of Denmark. 
This church was the state church into which one was born. No personal 
commitment needed to be made to the faith, yet one could claim faith. 
The c 1 ergy had so 1 d themse 1 ves to the 11 system" and indeed had become 
an inextricable part of it. They no longer were the clergy separated 
unto God but rather to State Christianity. 
Ki erkegaard • s po 1 emi cs thundered out against the comp 1 acency 
he found in the church. He saw the figures he respected (Mynster) 
not only representing this complacency but perpetuating it with their 
messages and their 1 i ves. The message, as he saw it, promoted not 
the individual commitment to a difficult life with Christ as dem-
onstrated by the gospels, but a complacent and placid trip along the 
open road of ease in State religion. 11 
C. The Father 
S0ren Kierkegaard•s relationship with his father was one of 
strained intimacy. 12 Michael Kierkegaard was a man of unusual wealth 
10Ibid., p. 1. 
11 Peter P. Rohde, 11 S0ren Kierkegaard: The Father of Exis-
tentialsim," Essays on Kierkegaard, ed. Jerry H. Gill (Minneapolis: 
Burgess Pub. Co., 1969), p. 29. A comtemporary of S0ren Kierkegaard, 
N.F.S. Grundtvig, promoted existential thought but emphasized fellow-
ship in a Christian sense. S0ren Kierkegaard grudgingly recognized 
him as a religious genius but remained in opposition to his deni-
gration of the individual as S0ren Kierkegaard saw it. 
12Ibid., pp. 45-51. 
9. 
by virtue of the inheritance of his uncle's textile business. Michael 
had suffered deep physical and emotional pain as a child because of 
the harsh environment in which he was born. One night as a young 
shepherd boy he turned in des per at ion and cursed God. From that time 
forward a strange brooding and melancholy settled upon him because 
he felt he had committed the unpardonable sin. 13 This guilt and sor-
row was carried.heavily by the father until his death was subliminally 
implanted in his sons. 14 
In 1797 Michael Kierkegaard remarried after the death of his 
first wife, who bore him no children. His second wife he felt re-
quired to marry as she bore him a daughter only four months after 
their marriage. She had been a house-servant and Michael's indis-
cretion now added another sin to the heavy guilt he already bore. 15 
Between the years 1832 and 1834 severe calamities befell the 
family. In the space of these years the mother and five of the seven 
children died leaving only the old man, S0ren and his older brother 
Peter to carry on. 16 These events produced a great de a 1 of anxiety 
and despair within the father. Thus the old man was religiously 
severe and his deep melancholy infected his two remaining sons. 17 
13Elmer H. Duncan, S0ren Kierkegaard (Waco, Texas: Word Books, 
1976) ' pp. 17-18. 
14Ibid., p. 18. 
15Ibid., p. 18. 
16L · 't 64 65 owne, op. c1 . , pp. - . 
17
carnell, op. cit., p. 17. 
10. 
The father exerted a strong and lifelong influence over S~ren 
to whom S~ren fe 1 t a rea 1 indebtedness. "I owe everything, from the 
beginning, to my father. When melancholy as he was, he saw me mel-
ancholy, his prayer to me was: Be sure that you really love Jesus 
Christ!" 18 
We can begin to appreciate the melancholy, gloomy S~ren as 
we read his writings. The development of his concept of anxiety and 
despair came largely out of his background. 19 As Kierkegaard perceived 
it, "a son is like a mirror in which the father beholds himself, and 
for the son the father too is like a mirror in which he beholds him-
self in the time to come." 20 
In the later days of the Father's life (probably around S~ren 
Kierkegaard's 22nd. birthday) a serious break came into the Father/Son 
re 1 ati onshi p. S~ren Ki erkegaard had become uneasy about his father's 
faith and his father revealed his own sin of sensuality. He confessed 
the premartial relations he had with S~ren Kierkegaard's mother. 21 
For S~ren Ki erkegaard this event became the "great earthquake" to 
which he refers throughout his writing. It was because of this event 
that S.K. went down the road of "perdition" for a time. 
18Ibid., p-. 17. 
19Ibid. 
20s~ren Kierkegaard, Stages on Life's Way trans. Walter Lowrie, 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1945), p. 192. 
21 Rohde, op. cit., p. 1. 
11. 
Reconciliation between the two took place on S0ren Ki er-
kegaard's twenty-fifth birthday, when the father confessed his guilt 
and "secret." The so called "unpardonable sin," was now revealed to 
his son. This confession caused the reconciliation to take place as 
S¢ren Kierkegaard realized the cost to his father of such an intimate 
reve 1 at ion. 22 A short whi 1 e 1 ater S0ren Ki erkegaard' s father died. 
S0ren remarked in his journal: 
My father died on Thursday, .the eighth (1838), at two 
o'clock in the night. I had so heartily wished that he might 
live a few years 1 onger, and I regard his death as the last 
sacrifice his love for me occasioned; for not only has he died 
from me but died for me~ 3 in order that if possible something may be made of me still. 
We can see the influence of the father upon S0ren Kierkegaard. 
However, we must be careful not to suggest that S0ren's character was 
fixed. There is no doubt that inheritance and environment had a 
prodigious influence upon his 1 i fe, but his own philosophy rejects 
the "fixing of fate." 24 
S0ren Kierkegaard attained an understanding of himself 
by reviewing his life from early childhood and he had an un-
usually vivid feeling of solidarity with "the family, the 
clan, the race"; but on the other hand, the freedom and re-
sponsibility of the individual was his most ardent conviction, 
and therefore he accounted "the individual higher than the 
race."25 
22Howard v. Hong and Edna H. Hong ed. trans., S0ren Kierkegaards 
Journals and Papers, IV (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1978), 
p. 122. 
23L . 't 120 owne, op. c1 . , p. . 
24Ibid., p. 29. 
25 Ibid., p. 30. 
12. 
D. Education 
Sl!lren Kierkegaard's education followed the usual course of 
students for that day. He attended public schools from which he grad-
uated at the age of seventeen. He was not regarded as an exceptional 
student but showed an aptitude for Latin. Although he was the brunt 
of cruel jokes, because of his odd appearance and physical fraility, 
he was very able to protect himself with a remarkable wit. 26 
Upon his dismissal from preparatory school his principal wrote 
that his nature was "very gay and frank." Likely this was Sl!lren 
Kierkegaard's way of concealing his melancholy as we read in his 
journa 1 for the year 1837: "I am a two faced Janus: with one face 
I laugh, with the other I cry." 27 
In the year 1830 he entered the University in Copenhagen and 
gave himself over to his studies. He found great joy in the liberal 
arts from which he had been deprived in his father's home. He showed 
real brilliance in philosophy, physics and mathematics and as a con-
sequence was slower, than his father would have liked, in beginning 
his thelogical studies. 28 
It was upon the death of his father that "it became a pious 
26oavid F. Swenson, Something About Kierkegaard (Minneapolois: 
Augusburg Pub. House, 1941), pp. 6-7. 
27Hong and Hong, op. cit., v1. 5 (1978) p. 107. 
28Lowrie, op. cit., p. 58. 
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duty" for him at least to take his theological degree, for as he said, 
"You cannot dispute with a dead man." In 1840 he became a candidate 
in Theo 1 ogy. 29 He comp 1 eted this course of study over the next two 
years. On July 16, 1841 the faculty accepted his dissertation, "The 
Concept of Irony" for the master's degree. 30 
S0ren Kierkegaard completed his formal education with the ef-
fectuation of his theological degree. While he never was able to use 
his theological degree as a pastor, (which he deeply desired to do) 
much of his writing reflects his theological concerns as we have seen 
in "Fear and Tremb 1 i ng" and "The concept of Dread," and other works. 
E. Kierkegaard's Vocation 
1. The Individual 
Kierkegaard's vehement protest was against Hegelianism, which 
b 1 anketed Europe. He spent a good de a 1 of time upgrading the in-
dividual and downgrading the group or the mass which Hegel's phi-
losophy promoted. While Kierkegaard extended great energy in 
attempting to overthrow Hege 1 i ani sm he st i 11 respected Hege 1' s work. 
If he had written his whole logic and declared in the Pre-
face that it was only a thought-experiment (in which, however, 
29swenson, op. cit., p. 12. 
30 Walter Lowrie, Kierkegaard (London: Oxford Univ. Press, 
1938) Appendix III. 
14. 
at many points he had shirked some things), he would have been 
the greatest thinker that ever 1 i ved. Now he is comic. 31 
It was the "system" that Hegel promoted to which S0ren Kier-
kegaard reacted. For S0ren Kierkegaard existence is much too complex 
for any system to encompass and any attempt to do so is comic. To · 
fight the battle Kierkegaard directly addressed Hegel. 
How frequ~ntly have I sworn that Hegel basically regards 
men, paganly, as an animal-race endowed with reason. In an 
animal-race 11 the single individual 11 is always lower than the 
.. race... The human race a 1 ways has the remarkab 1 e character 
that, just because every individual is created in the image 
of God, the 11 Single individual" is higher than the "race." 
That this can be taken in vain and horribly misused, I 
concede. But this is Christianity. And here is where the 
battle must really be fought.32 
Central for Kierkegaard is the dignity of the individual. 
To be an individual, to establish one's own individuality is part of 
becoming a Christian. Martin Heidegger would declare, "Authenticate 
yourself," while S0ren Kierkegaard saw authenticity as being realized 
through becoming an individual Christian. 
For Kierkegaard the way in which one became an individual was 
as important as being an individual, for everything was in process. 
Ki erkegaard thus became heavily Socratic. The Greek saying "Know 
31 s0ren Kierkegaard, tJohannes Climacus], Concluding Un-
scientific Postscript trans. Walter Lowrie (Princeton: Pr1nceton 
University Press, 1941) p. 558. Here is also quoted the longest ap-
preciative remarks Kierkegaard makes concerning Hegel. 
32Hong and Hong, op. cit., vl. 2. (1970) p. 224. 
15. 
Thyself" became important for him and was to be sought with all of 
ones might. What was done inwardly was infinitely more important than 
that which was done outwardly. 33 
The Socratic, maieutic art, was immediately claimed by Kier-
kegaard for his methodology. Thus, through dialogue and indirect com-
munication one may be brought to the sameplace as Socrates, when he 
declared that "he knew that he did not know: whereas others thought 
they knew, but in fact didn't know." 34 It is precisely at this point 
that one begins becoming an individual, for now one can learn. 
Learning cannot take place if one smuggly thinks he knows. Kierkegaard 
saw himself as the midwife in the process of ideological birth. 
Socrates, 1 ike Ki erkegaard, was con vi need that he would cheat others 
if he did not force them to have a "stinging experience of their own 
. .,35 1gnorance. 
Kierkegaard understood that his assignment was to "make people 
individuals." 
There cannot really be the 1 east doubt that what Chris-
tianity needs is another Socrates who could existentially 
express ignorance with the same cunning dialectical sim-
plicity, or as it should be said: I cannot understand the 
33carnell, op. cit., pp. 27-28. 
34 Ibid., p. 29. 
35 Ibid. 
16. 
the first thing about faith, but I believe. But it is all that 
understanding and conceiving which is the misfortune.36 
To be an individual is an arduous and demanding thing. Kierkegaard 
did not attempt to make it any easier but instead realized the respon-
sibilities such an individual must undertake if he was to be a Chris-
tian in the true and proper sense. 
2. The Individual Christian 
Kierkegaard desired to make it difficult to be a Christian. 
He saw himself as a prophet, as the one who had the task of speaking 
agai-nst- those of the be 1 i evi ng community, those who no 1 anger were 
experiencing the passion of the gospel. 
My purpose is to make it difficult to become a Christian, yet 
not more difficult than it is, nor to make it difficult for 
stupid people, and easy for clever pates, but qualitatively 
difficult, and essentially difficult for every man equally, 
for essentially it is equally difficult for every man to re-
1 i nqui sh his understanding and his thinking, and to keep his 
soul fixed upon the absurd; it is comparatively more difficult 
for a man if he has much understanding - if we wi 11 keep in 
mind that not everyone who has 1 ost his understanding over 
Christianity thereby proves that he has any.37 
Ki erkegaard was determined to rescue Christianity from 
triviality and make being a Christian a difficult but meaningful 
thing. 38 Passion and sacrifice must replace the fashion and ceremony 
36 Ibid., p. 31. 
37s0ren Kierkegaard, Postscript, op. cit., p. 495. 
38rbid., pp. 339-340. Kierkegaard discusses his construction 
of a relation between eternity and time. Christianity as a phil-
osophi ca 1 doctrine that asks to be understood is the result not the 
triviality to which it has has been reduced. 
17. 
so preva 1 ent throughout the church. There needed to be a shift from 
the intellectual task of teaching what Christianity is, to the ex-
istential task of proclaiming acceptance of Christianity as a 
responsible act. Kierkegaard wished to help others ''make a transition . 
from comp 1 acency to passion ate concern, from noncha 1 ance before God 
to holy fear and trembling. 39 
3. The Individual Christian as Witness 
The individual as a Christian must also be a witness. A wit-
ness is one who proclaims the meaning of Christianity through acting 
Christianly in daily actions. 
What is a witness? A witness is a person who directly 
demonstrates the truth of the doctrine he proclaims - directly 
yes, in part by its being truth in him and blessedness, in 
part by vo 1 unteeri ng his persona 1 self and saying: Now see 
if you can force me to deny this doctrine.40 
The activity of being a witness was the activity that all 
Christians w.ere to be engaged in. This is the responsibility of the 
Christian. Kierkegaard again remarked in his Journal: "What I want 
is to spur people on to becoming moral characters, witnesses unto the 
truth, to be wi 11 i ng to suffer for the truth, and ready to give up 
worldly wisdom." 41 
39
carnell, op. cit., p. 37. 
40Hong and Hong, op. cit. , vl . IV, pp. 558-559. 
4\arnell, op. cit., p. 42. 
18. 
F. Regine Olsen 
While S~ren Kierkegaard was completing his theological degree 
he became engaged to a "sixteen year old girl of the Copenhagen 
bourgeoise ca 11 ed Regi ne 01 sen. "42 The 1 ove that S~ren Ki erkegaard 
felt for her was very strong, for often we see him reflect upon it 
and her throughout his works. Many of his works were stimulated by 
his affection for her and were written in the form of a reply: as 
. d. t . t. 43 1n 1rec commun1ca 1on. 
Nonetheless, and because of the intense devotion S~ren Kier-
kegaard had for Regine, he felt inclined to break the engagement. 
Many scholars have offered speculation concerning this event and have 
been led to ask the question, "Why did S~ren break the engagement with 
someone to whom he was apparently so devoted?" Rather than make any 
rash conjectures we shall allow Kierkegaard to speak for himself. 
Immediately I assumed a relationship to the whole family. 
I turned my virtuosity toward her father in particular, whom 
I always had liked very much anyway. 
But to the centra 1 issue: the next day I saw that I had 
made a mistake. Penitent that I was, my vitae ante acta, my 
melancholy - that was sufficient. 
I suffered indescribably during that time. 44 
42sontag, op. cit., p. 4. 
43some examples in S~ren Kierkegaard's writings are: Either/Or, 
Repetition and Fear and Trembling, pp. 89-101. 
44Hong and Hong, op, cit., vl. VI (1978), pp. 192-193. 
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The engagement was broken about two months 1 ater on October 
11, 1841. 45 Although Kierkegaard struggled tremendously through this 
time he remained firm in his conviction that he should not marry. 
His soul continued to be tortured with thoughts of her. 
It was his desire to make their separation easier for Regine. 
To protect her reputation, he decided to act as a scoundrel in the 
hopes that such behaviour would lessen her love for him46 and con-
vince others of his moral turpitude. 
Approximately a year and half after the break with Regine on 
Apri 1 16,1843, at evensong, another event occured between S0ren Ki er-
kegaard and Regine that gave a new direction to S0ren's life. 47 We 
read in his journal: 
At vespers on Easter Sunday in Frue Kirke (during Myster's 
sermon) she nodded to me. I do not know if it was p 1 eadi ng 1 y 
or forgivingly, but in any case, very affectionately. I had 
sat down in a p 1 ace apart, but she discovered it. Would to 
God she had not done so. Now a year and a ha 1 f of suffering 
and a 11 the enormous pains I took are wasted; she does not 
believe that I was a deceiver, she has faith in me. What or-
dea 1 s now 1 i e ahead of her. The next wi 11 be that I am a 
hypocrite. The higher we go the more dreadful it is. That 
a man ~~ my inwardness, of my religiousness, could act in such 
a way. 
45Lowrie, A Short Life, op. cit., p. 141. 
46 Ibid., pp. 141-143. Lowrie presents here a good discussion 
on the entire relationship between S0ren Kierkegaard and Regine. 
S0ren's attempts as a scoundrel were unsuccessful, as Regine im-
mediately saw through them. For additional explanation on S0ren's en-
gagement breaking, see Carnell pp. 21-22 and Duncan, S0ren Kierkegaard, 
pp. 22-24. 
47 Lowrie, A Short Life, op. cit., p. 156. 
48Hong and Hong, op. cit., Vl.5, p. 229. 
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Through S0ren Kierkegaard's inwardness this event became sig-
nificant for him, and his ideas began to spill over in literary pro-
duct ion. "The ideas stream down upon me - healthy, happy, plump, 
merry, blessed children, easily brought to birth, and yet all of them 
bearing the birth marks of my persona 1 i ty. "49 
The works were now done for Regine with whom he hoped for some 
kind of platonic reunion. These hopes were dashed when he returned 
to Copenhagen from Berlin where he had been working, to discover that 
Regine was engaged to one Fritz Schlege1. 50 Sometime later he again 
attempted to estab 1 ish a p 1 atonic re 1 at i onshi p with Regi ne and her 
new husband but was rebuffed. Kierkegaard was now released to "seal 
his engagement with God." With incredible fecundity Kierkegaard wrote 
volume after volume. 51 Although his love for Regine remained strong 
he was now free to do that for which he was meant. He was free to 
declare the church apostate and defend the individual in the face of 
the mass. 
G. The Corsair 
Ki erkegaard had intended to give up writing and seek country 
living after completing his long list of Philosophical-Literary Works. 
49Lowrie, A Short Life, op. cit., p. 157. 
50Ibid., p. 158. 
51 carnell, op. cit., p. 22. 
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He was, however, an established and acclaimed author and so it could 
not be. One of his greatest admirers was a young man named Aaron 
Goldschmidt who published a political journal called the Corsair. 
While Sr6ren Kierkegaard regarded this publication as "gutter press," 
Goldschmidt looked up to Sr6ren Kierkegaard. The intent of the Corsair 
was to attack, from a liberal standpoint, the Autocracy, conservatism, 
and anything that smacked of reaction. 52 
Many prominent people of the day felt that the journal should 
be confronted. They requested Sr6ren Kierkegaard to do so as thus far 
he had escaped the "acid pen" of Goldschmidt. As soon as Sr6ren wrote 
his first article in criticism of the Corsair, Goldschmidt attacked 
Sr6ren in his paper, in text, as well as in caricature. This attack 
hurt Sr6ren deeply and he never fully recovered from it. Often he suf-
fered derisive and cruel remarks because of this event as he walked 
the streets of Copenhagen. The event yielded some positive results 
for Ki erkegaard. His fee 1 i ngs for the i ndi vi dua 1 and his contempt 
for the masses found clear expression. Kierkegaard thought that truth 
was a 1 ways in the minority. The minority was stronger than the 
majority because the majority consisted of those who had no opinion 
while the minority consisted of those who had an opinion. The 
strength of the majority was entirely illusory. 
No one wants to be that strenuous being - the single in-
di vi dua 1. But men everywhere are in the service of that 
52 Rohde, op. cit., p. 22. 
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deceitful substitute - a group. Let's a few of us join to-
gether, form a group - then we can surely do something53 This is the most profound demoralization of the human race. 
H. The Attack Upon Christendom 
A 11 of the conflicts of thought and event in S0ren Ki er-
kegaard's life were preparing him for what would be his final text 
and his strongest argument. The genera 1 attack upon Christendom came 
about as a result of S0ren Kierkegaard's reaction to two particular 
individuals: His father's pastor and now Bishop of the Church, Bishop 
Mynster and Professor Martenson, a man Kierkegaard knew from his 
university days, who succeeded Mynster in the Bishopric. 54 
S0ren Kierkegaard respected Bishop Mynster as a Churchman and 
knew him to be a man of deep piety. Nonetheless, S0ren also realized 
that Mynster was inextricably bound up with the established, in-
stitutional church and was a symbol of "state-religion" which S0ren 
saw as a falsification of Christianity. 
Bishop Mynster's service to Christianity is essentially, 
that, through his outstanding persona 1 ity, his culture, his 
superiority in distinguished circles, he has created the 
fashion or more solemn way of regarding Christianity as some-
thing no deep and earnest person (how flattering to the per-
sons concerned!) could do without. 
However, this service, eternally and Christianly under-
stood, is dubious, for Christianity is something much too dis-
tinguished to need patronage. 
53Hong and Hong, op. cit., Vol. II, p. 422. 
54Lowrie, A Short Life, op. cit., pp. 4-5. 
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And yet in his earnestness there is something of a milange 
- so touched, so profoundly moved by the thought of those 
glorious ones - and so sensitive when it comes to the part 
where this should be made earnest by minimizing oneself just 
a little bit. 
And yet I love Bishop Mynster; it is my only wish to do 
everything to reinforce the esteem for him; for I have admired 
him and, humanly speaking, do admire him; and every time I 
am able to do anything for his benefit, I think of my father, 
whom it pleases, I believe.55 
Kierkegaard did not begin publishing his polemics until Bishop 
Mynster had died and Martensen had assumed the role of Bishop. Fol-
lowing the funeral of Mynster at which Martensen had given the eulogy; 
S0ren Kierkegaard wrote his first polemic. He chose Martensen for 
the brunt of his attack because of Martensen's funeral oration over 
Bishop Mynster. Martensen called Mynster "one of the witnesses for 
the truth who, 1 ike a sacred chain, stretch down the ages from the 
days of the Apostle." 56 
Kierkegaard could not keep his pen silent any longer. To him 
this was a terrible offence to true Christian values and so he wrote. 
It was not until almost a year later that Kierkegaard's discretion 
allowed him to publish this first article in the "Fatherland." 57 He 
continued to publish articles of the same nature in the "Fatherland" 
until he was able to publish his own little pamplet which was called 
the "Instant." 
55Hong and Hong, op. cit. Vl 6, p. 15. 
56
sontag, op. cit. , p. 10. 
57Lowrie, A Short Life, p. 241. Lowrie describes in detail 
the reasons why S~ren Kierkegaard did not publish immediately. He 
also outlines the reactions of the public and other points of interest. 
The "Fatherland" was the local newspaper. 
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The gist of what Sl?lren Ki erkegaard was trying to say can be 
found in a separate tract he ca 11 ed "The Cry." ·His anger was with 
the Church as he saw it in Denmark at the time. He said, 
Whoever thou art, whatever in other respects thy life may 
be, my friend, by ceasing to take part (if ordinarily thou 
doest) in the public Worship of God, as it now is (with the 
claim that it is the Christianity of the New Testament), thou 
hast constantly one guilt the less, and that a great one: Thou 
doest not take part in treating God as a fool by calling 
that the Christianity of the New Testament which is not the 
Christianity of the New Testament.58 
Kierkegaard's little pamphlet the "Instant" became a good 
success and a 11 owed him to become popular once again in the eyes of 
the pub 1 i c. He produced sever a 1 editions of the magazine and was 
furiously working on his last when he collapsed and was taken to the 
hospita 1. It was 40 days 1 ater that Sl?lren Ki erkegaard died on 
November 11, 1855. 59 In the words of Edward J. Carne 11, "Thus God's 
faithful hound, heated from the chase, lay down to his eternal 
reward." 60 
58s0ren Ki erkegaard , Attack Upon Christendom trans. Walter 
Lowrie (Boston: Beacon Press, 1944), p. 59. 
59Lowrie, A Short Life, op. cit. pp. 253-256. 
60
carnell, op. cit., pp. 25-26. 
CHAPTER THREE 
THE NATURE OF THE HUMAN INDIVIDUAL 
AND THE MEANING OF HIS EXISTENCE 
Kierkegaard's concept concerning the unique importance of 
the individual person was one of his most important contributions 
during his mature years. Another, equally important contribution, 
was his critique of the ecclesiastical establishment in Denmark. 1 
The nature of the i ndi vi dua 1 as a category 1 ay at the very heart of 
Kierkegaard's thought. It reflected the radical departure from 
Hegelianism for which Kierkegaard strove. It was within this category 
that modern existential thought found its "raison d'etre." For Kier-
kegaard the foundation of his entire viewpoint was "the individual 
before God," 2 which he defended with all of his dialectical genius. 
Kierkegaard did most of his defending and uplifting of the 
individual in two major works. The first of these works he published 
1James D. Collins, The Mind of Kierkegaard (Chicago: H. Reg-
nery Co., 1953), p. 175. S.K. expended a good deal of energy in crit-
icizing the ecclesiastical establishment of Denmark. The polemics 
written in this vein in his later life have been collected into one 
volume called "The Attack Upon Christendom." While this critique of 
Christendom was extremely important it is beyond the scope of this 
paper. 
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was called The Concept of Anxiety, 3 while the second was The Sickness 
Unto Death which also considered the anthropological aspects of 
freedom. 4 
S. K. never intended that man should be understood in an ob-
jective or ontological manner. Instead he asked that man be inter-
preted functionally or existentially. 5 He set out to do this by 
placing man in a synthesis. 6 Kierkegaard made clear what he meant by 
such a synthesis. 
That anxiety makes its appearance is the pivot upon which 
everything turns. Man is a synthesis of the psychical and 
the physical; however, a synthesis is unthinkable if the two 
are not united in a third. This third is spirit.? 
There appeared to be an attempt by S. K. to convert Hege 1 ian 
terms and concepts into existential acceptability. When positing the 
tripartite theory of three simultaneous elements in man, Kierkegaard 
moved from Hegel when he suggested that spirit is not merely the third 
3Modern scholarly op1mon seems to suggest that the title "The 
Concept of Anxiety" conveys more the sense of Kierkegaard's intention 
than the more traditional "The Concept of Dread," as used by Walter 
Lowrie in his translation. For a discussion of both points of view 
see, Rei dar Thomte, ed. trans., The Concept of Anxiety, by S~ren 
Kierkegaard (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1980), pp. vii-
xviii, and Walter Lowrie, trans., The Concept of Dread, by S~ren Kier-
kegaard (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1944), pp. ix-x. 
4 -Walter Lowrie, trans., The Concept of Dread, by S~ren Kier-
kegaard (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1944), p. viii. 
5E.J. Carnel 1, The Burden of S~ren Kierkegaard (Grand Rapids: 
Wm. B. Eerdmans Pub. Co., 1965), p. 43 
6 Ibid . , p. 44. 
7s0ren Kierkegaard, [Vigilius Haufniensis], The Concept of 
Anxiety, ed. trans. by Reidar Thomte (Princeton: Princeton Un1vers1ty 
Press, 1980), p. 43. 
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moment in the dialectic of soul, consciousness and spirit. 8 Instead 
S.K. proposed that Man should be defined as 11 a synthesis of soul 
and body supported by spirit, 11 whereupon the synthesis received the 
emphasis being supported by spirit. 9 
A. First Synthesis - Body, Soul and Spirit 
Kierkegaard realized that freedom was the critical distinction 
between man and animal. By freedom he meant the abi 1 ity to make cor-
rect ethical choices. 10 S.K. did not see man as purely body. Man 
was able to decide, able to accept or reject. The moral qualities 
in Man made it possible for him to be an individual and a Christian. 11 
Actually it is the conscience which constitutes a per-
sonality; personality is an individual determinatedness 
confirmed by being known by God in the possibility of con-
science. The conscience may sleep, but the possibility of 
it is constitutive. Otherwise the determinateness would be 
a transitory feature. Not even the consciousness of the 
determinateness, self-consciousness, is constitutive, inasmuch 
as it is only the relationship in which determinateness re-
1 ates itself to itself; whereas God's shared knowledge [Guds 
Samviden] is the stabilization, the confirmation.l2 
For Kierkegaard man's moral character is the work of spirit. 
8
collins, op. cit., p. 205. 
9 Ibid. 
10
carnell, op. cit., P· 44. 
11 Carne 11, op. cit., p. 44. 
12Howard V. Hong and Edna H. Hong, ed. trans., Sl6ren Ki er-
kegaard' s Journa 1 s and Papers II I { Bloomington: Indiana Um vers1 ty 
Press, 1975}, p. 483. 
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He saw spirit as a psychological moral entity rather than a meta-
physical one. 13 Kierkegaard•s concept of spirit is not intended to 
rule out the soul and body, rather it is S.K. •s intention to emphasize 
the distinction between what man is, as a natural thing, and what man 
makes of himself as a responsible agent. A man does not find himself 
in a spiritual condition, until he has placed his powers in the 
service of God or the devi1. 14 But what is the role of spirit in the 
nature of man? 
In innocence, man is not merely animal, for if he were 
at any moment of his life merely animal, he would never become 
man. So spirit is present, but as immediate, as dreaming. 
Inasmuch as it is now present, it is in a sense a hostile 
power, for it constantly disturbs the relation between soul 
and body, a relation that indeed has persistence and yet does 
not have endurance, inasmuch as it first receives the 1 atter 
by the spirit. On the other hand, spirit is a friendly power, 
since it is precisely that which constitutes the relation. 
What, then, is man's relation to this ambiguous power? How 
does Spirit relate itself to itself and to its conditionality? 
It relates itself as anxiety.l5 
Spirit, while it works through the soul, is not soul. Spirit 
makes it possible for man to experience a personal transformation 
through a shift from ethical possibility to ethical being. 16 11 Thus, if 
body and soul go far in explaining the descriptive essence of man, 
13
collins, op. cit., p. 206. 
14 Ibid. 
15
s0ren Kierkegaard, Concept of Anxiety, pp. 43-44. 
16
carnell, op. cit., p. 46. 
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spirit goes far in explaining the imperative essence." 17 Reinhold Nie-
buhr described spirit as an expression of freedom that allows man to 
stand "outside of nature, life, himself, his reason and the world." 18 
He also made clear that man was a problem unto himself and was thus 
limited by his nature. Kierkegaard also realized this and saw that 
even though man was limited by his nature, he was rationally and 
spiritually free to stand outside this limitation by his ability to 
imagine possibilities that terminate only in eternity. 19 
B. Second Synthesis - The Temporal and Eternal 
The second synthesis is rather confusing. No sooner did Kier-
kegaard posit the synthesis than he negated it. For Kierkegaard 
anxiety is the element by which man is driven to God. 
As for the latter synthesis, it is immediately striking 
that it is formed differently from the former. In the former, 
the two factors are psyche and body, and spirit is the third, 
yet in such a way that one can speak of a synthesis only when 
spirit is posited. The latter synthesis has only two factors, 
the tempora 1 and the eterna 1 . Where is the third factor? 
And if there is no third factor, there really is no synthesis, 
for a synthesis that is a contradiction cannot be completed 
as a synthesis without a third factor, because the fact that 
the synthesis is a contradiction asserts that it is not. 
What, then, is the temporal?20 
17 Ibid. 
18Reinhold Niebuhr, The Nature and Destiny of Man (New York: 
Charles Scribner's Sons, 1946), VI. 1, pp. 3-4. 
19carnell, op. cit., p. 47. 
20s~ren Kierkegaard, The Concept of Anxiety, p. 85. 
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Kierkegaard suggested that the second synthesis is not really 
a synthesis but a new expression for the first synthesis. Of course, 
S.K. does not concern himself with the confusion this may have caused 
the reader for he merely exercised the pri vi 1 edge of one who inter-
preted man functionally and existentially rather than scientifically 
b . t. 1 21 or o JeC 1Ve y. 
The synthesis of the tempora 1 and the eterna 1 is not 
another synthesis but is the expression for the first syn-
thesis, according to which man is a synthesis of psyche and 
body that is sustained by spirit. As soon as the spirit is 
posited, the moment is present. Therefore one may rightly 
say reproachfully of man that he lives only in the moment, 
because that comes to pass by an arbitrary abstraction. 
Nature does not lie in the moment.22 
Man's nature consisted of body, soul and spirit, the spirit being that 
which united the body and soul. The second synthesis merely gave ex-
pression to the first synthesis when it described man as functionally 
able to unite eternity in time. For Kierkegaard this meant that man 
must be approached as a creature who has the existential respon-
sibility tomediateeternity in time. 23 
The Kierkegaardian phrase, "Truth is Subjectivity," began to 
take on real meaning when the eternal was ethically perceived and thus 
brought into time "whenever a concerned human being undertakes the 
2\arnell, op. cit., p. 47. 
22
s0ren Kierkegaard, The Concept of Anxiety, p. 88-89. 
23
carnell, op. cit., p. 49. 
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task of existence so seriously that his very selfhood is at stake." 24 
Kierkegaard became more pleased as he saw the individual 
pushed closer to the brink of paradox for it was here that man became 
an individual and a Christian. Anxiety and despair were necessary 
ingredients to drive one towards God. Despair and anxiety revea 1 
paradox which demonstrated to man his naked need for God, driving him 
towards God. 
The torment of despair is precisely this, not to be able to 
die ... the hopelessness in this case is that even the last 
hope, death, is not available. When death is the greatest 
danger, one hopes for 1 ife; but when one becomes acquainted 
with an even more dreadful danger, one hopes for death. So 
when the danger is so great that death has become one's hope, 25 despair is the disconsolateness of not being able to die. 
But in the last resort, that is, when the point is to believe, 
the only help is this, that for God all things are possible.26 
The fi na 1 hope of Ki erkegaard was that man would be driven 
to God. Kierkegaard's men, however, could be utterly opposed to each 
other. The most sharply defined individuals are the sinner and the 
man of grace. But the saint is the richer individual because he 
1 . d t th t t th . b "1 . t. f . t 27 rea 1ze o e u mos , e poss1 1 1 1es o ex1s ence. 
24 Ibid. 
25s0ren Kierkegaard, [Anti-Climacus], The Sickness Unto Death 
trans. Walter Lowrie (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday Anchor Books, 1941), 
pp. 150-151. 
26 Ibid., p. 172. 
27collins, op. cit., p. 207. 
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Herein 1 ay the fundament a 1 characteristics of the nature of 
Kierkegaard•s man - the possibility of being an individual Christian 
standing before God, with Christ as the model individua1. 28 
Only as an individual can a man ever relate himself most 
truly to God, for he can best have the perception of his own 
unworthiness alone; it is almost impossible to make this 
really clear to another person; besides, it could easily be-
come affected.29 
C. Existence 
Kierkegaard•s concern for the individual did much for his 
understanding of the nature of man. The existence of man was a 1 so 
a concern of S.K. In particular he wished to dilineate the in-
gredients of existence for the individual. Authentic existence30 
was to be 11 a living condition in which spirit, having soared to 
eternity, arouses man to such a state of ethical and passionate 
decision that the atoms of eternity are mediated in time instant after 
instant. 11 31 Every moment has infinite value for the individual in 
time and yet ten thousand years are but a trifle, when considered in 
28
collins, op. cit., p. 207. 
29Hong and Hong, op. cit., vl. II (1970), p. 405. 
30Authenti~ existence is a term used to describe the existence 
of a true individual as opposed to the 11 in-authentic .. existence of 
one who has not realized his individuality existentially or func-
tionally. Martin Hiedegger more or less popularized the terms 
authentic as in 11 authenticate youself, .. but did not share S.K.•s de-
sire to goad people into becoming Christians or into standing before 
God. 
31 carnell, op. cit., p. 53. 
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in relation to eternity. 32 
Existence must encompass the full understanding of both the 
infinite and the finite, the temporal and the eternal. 
Existence is the child that is born of the infinite and 
the finite, the eternal and the temporal, and is therefore 
a constant striving ... the thinking subject is an existing 
individual. It is only systematists and objective phil-
osophers who have ceased to be human beings, and have become 
speculative philosophy in the abstract, an entity which be-
longs in the realm of pure being. . . . however much the 
subject has the infinite within himself through being an 
existing individual, he is in the process of becoming.33 
Ki erkegaard cone 1 uded that existence is by nature hi stori ca 1 
and must be grasped by faith. 34 In this fashion S.K. dispensed with 
Hegelian historical determinism and replaced it with his own concept: 
"historical becoming." 35 Man was the center of history and so through 
his becoming hi story likewise becomes. Man was not merely a being 
to which something from the outside affected him. Rather he was a 
being in time able to rec a 11 and ref 1 ect upon the past in order to 
come to a reasonable estimate of the uncertain but determinable 
future. 36 
Authentic existence took p 1 ace when eternity and time were 
32s0ren Ki erkegaard, [Johannes Cl imacus], Concluding Un-
scientific Postscript, trans. David Swenson and Walter Lowrie, 
Princeton: Princeton Unversity Press, 1941), pp. 84-85. 
33 Ibid., p. 85. 
34co 11 ins, op. cit. , p. 166. Hei degger and Barth are re-
presentative of the several tendencies to which S.K. 's thought have 
given rise. 
35 Ibid., p. 168. 36collins, op. cit., p. 169. 
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mediated by 1 ove; spirit became active through hope and the more 
active spirit was, the more 1 ove was rea 1 i zed. "Spirit, in other 
words, fills the instant (an atom of eternity) with works of love." 37 
In sum, whenever a human being rejects the responsi-
bilities of love, he becomes spiritless; and being spiritless, 
he is only a potential person, for he had failed to complete 
the sythesis which forms the substance of geniune selfhood 
- i.e., he has not taken seriously his God-given duty to 
mediate the absolute quality of eternity in the relativity 
of time. Such a human being continues to occupy space on this 
planet, to be sure, but this does not make him either an in-
dividual or a Christian. Unless spirit rises to its true 
heights, potentiality does not convert to actuality.38 
D. 11 Existence-spheres" - The dialectic of Inwardness 
Ki erkegaard has stated that truth is subjectivity. By this 
he meant a condition of passionate, ethical inwardness which involved 
the very being of the who 1 e self. Therefore the more passion ate ly 
one decides to be, the more perfectly he becomes truth. 39 With these 
thoughts at the fore of this thinking, Kierkegaard developed a concept 
we may call the "dialectic of inwardness," whose purpose was to help 
37carnell, op. cit., p. 55. 
38 Ibi d. Hei degger used the term "Dasei n" to indicate what 
existence implied. The English translation may be "thereness." S.K. 
used the term 11 interest" to indicate our involvement in the objective 
world is so intimate that it cannot be regarded objectively, i.e. 
disinterestedly. Heidegger also used the term "angst" to describe 
the "dread" or "anxiety" that S.K. saw as driving one toward God and 
Heidegger saw as driving one towards authentic existence. 
39carnell, op. cit., p. 39. 
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one discover his position within the "stages" 40 on life's way. 41 
S.K. outlined three spheres through which one's life preceeded. 
There are three existence-spheres: the aesthetic, the 
ethical, the religious. The metaphysical is abstraction, 
there is no man who exists metaphysically. The metaphysical, 
ontology, is but it does not exist; for when it exists it is 
in the aesthetic, in the ethical, in the religious, and when 
it is it is the abstraction of or the "prius" for the aes-
thetic, the ethical, the religious. The ethical sphere is 
only a transitional sphere, and hence its highest expression 
is repentance as a negative action. The aesthetic sphere is 
that of immediacy, the ethical that of requirement (and this 
requirement is so infinite that the individual always goes 
bankrupt), the religious sphere is that of fulfilment, but 
note, not such a fulfilment as when one fills a cane or a bag 
with gold, for repentance has made infinite room, and hence 
the re 1 i gi ous contradiction. . . . 42 
1. Aesthetic Sphere 
The aesthetic sphere was stated most c 1 ear 1 y in "Either /Or" 
originally, and finally presented in his "Stages on Life's ·way." 
S.K's other works such as the "Postscript" refine the point of view 
while the "Repetitions" criticize the aesthetic way of life. The book 
"Either/Or" came to no conclusions. The first volume dealt with the 
aesthetic sphere and the second volume with the ethical sphere. 
40stages does not appear to be the best term to use here, but 
S.K. does use it in the title of his book. However, a better term 
and one S.K. used more frequently is "spheres" or "existence spheres." 
We sha 11 use this term from here on. Duncan in his book "SI6ren Ki er-
kegaard,"discusses more completely the problem of the terms, pp. 29-
30. 
41 carnell, op. cit., p. 56. 
42sl6ren Kierkegaard, Stages of Life's Way ed. Hilarius Bog-
binder, trans. Walter Lowrie (Princeton: Princeton Univ. Press, 1940), 
p. 430. 
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Because there was no conclusion we must assume that S.K. had some 
other resolution in mind. Of course, this came about in his religious 
sphere. 
The aesthetic sphere was 1 arge ly characterized by p 1 easure. 
In the diary of the seducer in Either/Or it was remarked of the 
aesthetic man that "his whole life was motivated by enjoyment." 43 This 
mode of existence may be said to be "psychically determined." 44 The 
characteristics of such a mode were stability, order, and objectivity 
and so a way of life, but it lacked the individual awareness of the 
possibility of being a self. 45 
For Ki erkegaard one of the greatest travesties committed by 
man was committed by the aesthetic man. He has not involved himself 
in the task of living. Inwardly and essentially he remains uncom-
mitted person because he did not have an existent i a 1 fear of the 
eterna1. 46 To be an aesthetic man meant that one attempted to avoid 
all suffering and all paradox and replace it with immediacy. An 
th t . . t . h . b . 47 aes e 1c man JUS 1s; e never 1s ecom1ng, nor does he desire 
to. 
4\0ren Kierkegaard, Either/Or 2 vols., ed. Victor Eremite, 
trans. Walter Lowrie (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1954), p. 301. 
44Jerry H. Gill, "The Ethical - Religious," Essays on Kier-
kegaard, ed. Jerry H. Gi 11 (Mi nneapo 1 is; Burgess Pub. Co., 1969), 
p. 151. 
45 Ibid. 
46carnell, ·t 60 op. c1 . , p. . 
47 Ibid., p. 61. 
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The aesthetic choice is either entirely immediate and to 
that extent no choice, or it loses itself in the multifarious. 
Thus, when a young girl follows the choice of her heart, this 
choice, however beautiful it may be, is in the strictest sense 
no choice, since it is entirely immediate .... and because 
when one does not choose absolutely one chooses only for the 
moment, and therefore can choose something different the next 
moment.48 
The critical thing that the aesthetic man did not do is make 
a decision, at 1 east in the strictest sense. The aesthetic man fo 1-
lowed his inclinations rather than weighing the possible alternatives 
and making a decision between them. In this manner the aesthetic man 
continued to live statically. He existed on the basis of what he is 
already, taken immediately. 49 
The choice itself is decisive for the content of the per-
sona 1 ity, through the choice the persona 1 ity immerses i tse 1 f 
in the thing chosen,., and when it does not choose it withers 
away in consumption.~O 
While Kierkegaard did find the aesthetic sphere to be the 
lowest expression of individual existence he did recognize it as an 
essential element in existence. Kierkegaard had learned upon leaving 
his father's home to enjoy the aesthetic elements of life. Often he 
attended the opera, appreciated fully the glories of nature and many 
of the pleasures the Danish culture afforded. 51 His vocation also had 
48s¢ren Kierkegaard, Either/Or, op. cit., Vol. 2, p. 171. 
49oavid F. Swenson, Something About Kierkegaard {Minneapolis: 
Augsburg Pub. House, 1941), p. 127. 
50s¢ren Kierkegaard, Either/Or, op. cit., Vol. 2, p. 167. 
51 collins, op. cit., p. 47. 
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some aesthetic overtones. He saved some of his sharpest comments for 
the philosophers, the writers etc. S.K. was able to extricate himself 
from any aesthetic accusations by demonstrating that he approached his 
vocation with true inwardness, addressing the problems functionally 
and existentially rather than scientifically or objectively as was 
52 the Hegelian approach. The aesthetic is not evil in and of itself 
until one no longer desires to "leap" into another sphere because of 
despair and eternal fear, the end result of an aesthetic life style. 53 
The aesthetic values were redeemable for S.K., once the claim to 
absoluteness had been rejected. 54 
a. Transition of Spheres 
The transition from the aesthetic sphere to ethical sphere 
was important for the individual. The movement from the aesthetic 
sphere to the ethical mode of existence placed exhausting demands upon 
the individual. 
To escape the pathos of the aesthetic sphere one must have 
experienced the c 1 eansi ng despair which accompanied the me 1 ancho ly 
of boredom. 55 "There comes a moment in a man's life when his immediacy 
52Paul TiHich, A Complete History of Christian Thought (New 
York: Harper & Row Pub., 1968) part II, p. 169. 
53Justo L. Gonzalez, A History of Christian Thought (Nashville 
Abingdon Press, 1975) Vol. III, p. 337. 
54collins, op. cit., p. 42. 
55carnell, op. cit., p. 65. 
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is, as it were, ripened and the spirit demands a higher form in which 
it will apprehend itself as spirit. 56 
To pass from one sphere to the next required a 1 eap. Ki er-
kegaard seemed to imply that the leap from the aesthetical to the 
ethical was not of the same significance as the movement from the 
ethical to the religious. Certainly it was not as demanding upon the 
individual. However, Kierkegaard felt that a leap was necessary to 
move from the aesthetical to the ethical. 
The transition from eudaemonism to the concept of duty is an 
leap, or, assisted by a more and more developed understanding 
of what is most prudent, is one finally supposed to go 
directly over to virtue? No, there is no pain of decision 
which the sensuous (the eudaemonistic), the finite (the 
eudaemoni st i c) cannot endure. Man is not 1 ed to do duty by 
merely reflecting that it is the most prudent thing to do; 
in the moment of decision reason lets go, and he either turns 
back to eudaemonism or he chooses the good by a leap.57 
The 1 eap from one sphere to another was necessary for there 
was a chasm between the two. One was not able to simply blend or 
s 1 ide into the next sphere. A radi ca 1 decision had to be made to 
cross that chasm. Kierkegaard would not allow for an easy arrival; 
one must agonize with a decision to do the seemingly impossible. 
(The leap) ... is an act of isolation, which leaves it 
to the individual to decide, respecting that which cannot be 
thought, whether he will resolve believingly to accept it by 
virtue of absurdity.58 
56s0ren Kierkegaard, Either/Or, Vol. 2, p. 193. 
57Hong and Hong, op. cit., (1975), Vol. 3, p. 19. 
58s0ren Kierkegaard, Postscript, op. cit., p. 92. Within 
these pages S.K. spars with Less1ng, Jacobi and Mendelssohn concerning 
the leap. pp. 90-97. 
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We must make it c 1 ear that the different stages are not en-
tirely left behind as a result of the leaps. Rather, there are 
aesthetic elements in one's existence even though he may live at the 
ethical level. The primary consideration for Kierkegaard was that 
one was living within a particular stage and that there was movement 
directed towards the religious taking place. 59 This did not mean that 
the "leap" from the ethical to the religious put the existential 
choice betwen the two, behind forever. The three spheres of existence 
remained constant possibilities. 60 
2. Ethical Sphere 
Kierkegaard has already stated that man is a synthesis between 
the finite and the eternal. If this is so, then it may be said that 
the aesthetic viewed himself as within the finite and the ethicist 
viewed himself as within the eterna1, 61 " .. because the ethical 
is the very breath of the eternal, and constitutes even in solitude 
the reconciling fellowship with all men." 62 It was this understanding 
59Robert Breta 11, ed., A Ki er kegaard Antho 1 ogy (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 1947), pp. 174-175. There appears to be 
some discrepancy in the various interpretations of how the different 
spheres are actually related or interrelated. The difficulty seems 
not to 1 i e in Ki erkegaard' s concept of the sphere but rather in his 
ambiguity regarding the definition of the leap. He has left almost 
all of his discussion of the leap to his journals save for a few 
remarks previously referred to, in the"Postscript." 
60James C. Livingston, Modern Christian Thought (New York: 
Macmillan Pub. Co., Inc., 1971), p. 314. 
61
carnell, op. cit., p. 67. 
62
s0ren Kierkegaard, Postscript, op. cit., p. 136. 
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of uni versa 1 ob 1 i gation that caused man to enter the ethi ca 1 sphere. 
A person enters the ethical stage the moment he perceives 
serious re 1 at ion between ( 1) the essence of self, ( 2) the 
necessity of moment-by-moment choosing, and (3) a sense of 
duty which is nourished by the eternal.63 
To enter the ethical sphere was not to leave ones self behind. 
Instead, "He does not become another man than he was before, but he 
becomes himself, consciousness is unified, and he is himself ... 64 Where 
the aesthete was irresponsible the ethicist became responsible. 
The ethi ca 1 i ndi vi dua 1, to be sure, may venture to use 
the expression that he is his own editor, but at the same time 
he is fully conscious that he is responsible - responsibile 
to himself personally, inasmuch as what he chooses will have 
decisive influence upon him, responsible in view of the order 
of tbjngs in which he lives, and responsible in the sight of 
God.65 
The ethicist becomes what he becomes. 6? 
The leap to the ethical stage was characterized by the 
imperative"Choose thyself, .. that is, affirm an absolute choice. 67 11 He 
who chooses himself ethically has himself as his task, and not as a 
possibility merely, ..... 68 However, it was not the content of ones 
63carnel1, op. cit., p. 67. 
64s0ren Kierkegaard, Either/Or, op. cit., Vol. 2, p. 181. 
65 Ibid., P- 264. 
66 Ibid., p. 182. 
67Livingston, op. cit., p. jl4. 
68s0ren Kierkegaard, Either/Or, op. cit., Vol. 2, p. 262. 
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choice that was significant, rather it was the fact of the choice that 
had significance for the ethicist. The correctness of such a decision 
or choice was determined by the passionate inwardness or energy used 
by the ethicist. 
I should like to say that in making a choice it is not so much 
a question of choosing the right as of the energy, the 
earnestness, the pathos with which one chooses. Thereby the 
persona 1 i ty announces its inner i nfi ni ty, and thereby, in 
turn, the persona 1 i ty is con so 1 i dated. Therefore, even if 
a man were to choose the wrong, he will nevertheless discover, 
precisely by the reason of the energy with which he chose, 
that he had chosen the wrong. For the choice being made with 
the whole inwardness of his personality, his nature is 
purified and he himself brought into immediate relation to 
the eternal Power whose omnipresence interpenetrates the whole 
of existence.69 
Kierkegaard felt that the "ethical demand (was) that one be-
came infinitely interested in existing." 70 The aim of the ethical life, 
therefore, was to become the truth by transforming oneself. 71 The con-
cern of the ethicist no longer was centered in his own personal enjoy-
ment. Rather: 
The ethical is concerned with particular human beings, 
and with each and every one of them by himself. If God knows 
how many hairs there are on a man's head, the ethi ca 1 knows 
how many human beings there are; and its enumeration is not 
in the interest of a total sum, but for the sake of each in-
dividual, and when it judges, it judges each individual by 
himself; only a tyrant or an impotent man is content to 
69
s0ren Kierkegaard, Either/Or, op. cit., Vol. ~, p. 171. 
70
s0ren Kierkegaard, Postscript, op. cit., p. 280. 
71 L. . . 1v1ngston, op. c1t., p. 715. 
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decimate. The ethical lays hold of each individual and 
demands that he refrain from all contemplation, especially 
of humanity and the world; for the ethical, as being the in-
ternal, cannot be observed by an outsider. It can be realized 
only by the individual subject, who alone can know what it 
is that moves within him.72 
Therefore, the ethical sphere, unlike the aesthetic, involved the 
recognition that other lives also have a claim upon one's life. 73 
S.K. regarded the ethical life with real esteem. It was the 
sphere in which many peop 1 e 1 i ved; they were good citizens, good 
parents, responsible employees, and the only basis upon which society 
was possible. 74 
Kierkegaard has defined the ethical "as duty, and duty in turn 
is defined as congeries of particular propositions, "75 thus demanding 
that the ethicist do his duty. The ethicist has responded to the call 
but found he was unable to do his duty because: 
Ethics is still an ideal science, and not only in the 
sense that every science is ideal. Ethics proposes to bring 
ide a 1 ity into actua 1 ity. On the other hand, it is not the 
nature of its movement to raise actuality up into ideality. 
Ethics points to ide a 1 i ty as a task and assumes that every 
man possesses the requisite conditions. Thus ethics develops 
a contradiction, inasmuch as it makes clear both the dif-
ficulty and the impossibility. What is said of the law is 
also true of ethics: it is a disciplinarian that demands 
and by its demands only judges but does not bring forth life.76 
72
s0ren Kierkegaard, Postscript, op. cit., p. 284. 
73Gonzalez, op. cit., p. 338. 74 Ibid. 
75
s0ren Kierkegaard, Either/Or, op. cit., vl. II, p. 258. 
76
s0ren Kierkegaard, Concept of Anxiety, op. cit., p. 16. 
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As in the aesthetic sphere the ethicist was confronted by anxiety and 
despair at his inability to do that to which he had committed his 
1 ife. "A spiritually honest person wi 11 forthrightly acknowledge that 
the self has failed to close the gap between what it is and what it 
ought to be." 77 Only in the sphere of the religious can the ethicist 
be a "becoming Christian." The ethicist takes the leap of faith out 
of the ethi ca 1 "when one perceives the ethi ca 1 no 1 onger as one's 
guide for action, but as the temptation to trust in one's moral 
rectitude rather than in God - or in universal principles rather than 
in individual vocation." 78 
3. Religious Sphere 
The re 1 i gi ous sphere was the result of the norma 1 ascension 
of a striving existing individual. 
The normal life movement for an existing individual is 
from the esthetic, through the ethical to the religious. But 
this movement is not completed once for all, since existence 
poses the task of its incessent renewal. The existing thinker 
has esthetic passion enough to give his life content, ethical 
enthusiasm enough to regulate it, dialectic enough to inter-
pentrate it with thought. The esthetic is the raw materia 1; 
the ethi ca 1 posits the requirement and constitutes the pri n-
ciple of regulation; the religious is the fulfillment, but 
again not once for all, but as renewal reinstatement, and 
impulsive energy for the forward movement of existence.79 
77carnell, op. cit., p. 70. 
78Gonzales, op. cit., p. 338. 
79oavid F. Swenson, Something About Kierkegaard (Minneapolis: 
Augsburg, Pub. House, 1941), p. 77. 
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The religious sphere went beyond the aesthetic and the ethica1, 80 and 
was exposed in relation to that which interests us infinitely. 81 Be-
tween the ethi ca 1 and re 1 i gi ous there was no continuity, 82 but rather 
a dreadful gap crossable only by a leap of faith. The religious 
sphere was ruled by absolute rules whereas the ethical by the uni-
versa 1. The person who lived at the re 1 i gi ous 1 eve 1 knew that God 
was above his commands, that God gave the commands but was above them. 
Therefore, faith in God for the religious man was critical. Faith 
in God meant that the religious man was willing to risk all for the 
sake of God. The universal laws were generally binding, but the 
absolute grasped the individual in a unique concrete situation and 
there made its singular demand. The religious man knew that God stood 
above his own law. Forgiveness of sin became the theological element 
in the third sphere. 83 
Faith is related directly to God, and not to his law. 
For this reason, the ethical person knows of the commandments 
of God, but not of his forgiveness. The religious person, 
on the other hand, knows both that God commands and that God 
forgives. Whereas the ethi ca 1 person 1 i ves in despair and 
knows nothing but good and evil, the religious holds to faith 
which overcomes despair. Faith is indeed the opposite of 
despair, and therefore the only real sin is despair.84 
80The religious sphere is not the synthesis of the aesthetic 
and the ethi ca 1 the way spirit is the synthesis of body and soul. 
Rather the religious is a separate sphere rejecting contingency upon 
the others. 
81 Tillich, op. cit., p. 170. 
82Hegel's system would have offered a mediation between the 
two but, of course, S.K. saw this as inconsistent with true human 
existence. 
83Gonzalez, op. cit., p. 339. 84 Ibid. 
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This demanded that the religious man have absolute trust in 
God, which was the mark of the "Knight of Faith. "85 Faith characterized 
the life of the religious man because the Christian religion was a 
religion of faith. 86 God was the object of Faith as Kierkegaard saw 
it because we do not come to Him through objective knowledge but 
rather He came to us through our inwardness, thus making Him an object 
of Faith. Ki erkegaard was not interested then in offering proofs for 
God, for "To defend anything is always to discredit it." 87 Kierkegaard 
detested the way contemporary philosophers and theologians had offered 
"proofs" for God's existence. This kind of logical exercise brought 
no internal suffering but resulted in an intellectual arrogance be-
cause of their cerebral calisthenics which lead to scholastic re-
cognition rather than a fear of God. 
So rather let us sin, sin out and out, seduce maidens, 
murder men, commit highway robbery - after a 11 , that can be 
repented of, and such a criminal God can still get a hold on. 
But this proud superiority which has risen to such a height 
scarcely can be repented of, it has a semblance of profundity 
which deceives. So rather 1 et us mock God, out and out as 
has been done before in the world - this is always preferable 
to the disparaging air of importance with which one would 
prove God's existence. For to prove the existence of one 
who is present is the most shameless affront, since it is an 
85The "Knight of Faith" is a term coined by S.K. to describe 
the epitomy of Kierkegaard's philosophy. S.K. describes this in-
dividual thoroughly in "Fear and Trembling." Abraham emerges on these 
pages as the true "Knight of Faith." S.K. never became one because 
he lacked the courage. (Fear and Trembling, p. 82). 
86
ouncan, op. cit., p. 75. 
87
s0ren Kierkegaard, The Sickness Unto Death, op. cit., p. 
218. 
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attempt to make him ridiculous; but unfortunately people have 
no inkling of this and for sheer seriousness regard it as a 
pious undertaking. But how could it occur to anybody to prove 
that he exists, unless one had permitted oneself to ignore 
him, and now makes the thing all the worse by proving his 
existence before his very nose?88 
It was S.K. 1 s contention that philosophy and religious faith were not 
able to be united. This was central to his criticism of the ration-
alistic excesses of Hegelianism that were developed by professional 
t t . 89 sys ema 12ers. 
Ki erkegaard fe 1t no need to defend God 1 s existence. Man 1 s 
response to God was to be one of absolute trust or faith. This meant 
for the religious man that while he was aware of the universal com-
mands there may be particular situations that may be overcome by a 
higher command given by God. This 11 teleological suspension of the 
ethical 11 by the divine was unique to the true 11 Knight of Faith 11 which 
was exemplified by Abraham in relation to his son Isaac. Kierkegaard 
found the incident of Abraham about to kill his own son under the com-
mand of God, critical to his understanding of the religious, the 
ethical and the 11 religious. 11 He wrote his 11 Fear and Trembling 11 in 
an attempt to answer the questions of both a theological and a 
philosophical nature, raised by this incident. 
88s0ren Kierkegaard, Postscript, op. cit., p. 485. 
89charles J. Kelly, 11 Essential Thinking in Kierkegaard 1 S 
Critique of Proofs for the Existence of God, 11 The Journal of Religion, 
59 (April, 1979), p. 133. See the rest of this article for an 
analysis of Kierkegaard 1 S rejection of proofs for God. It is the 
author 1 S contention that Kierkegaard did not reject all proofs but 
the criticism comes from the perspective of essential thinking. 
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Kierkegaard stated; 
If faith does not make it a holy act to be willing to murder 
one's son, then let the same condemnation to be pronounced 
upon Abraham as upon every other man. . . . The ethi ca 1 ex-
pression for what Abraham did is, that he would murder Isaac; 
the religious expression is, that he would sacrifice Isaac; 
but precisely in this contradiction consists the dread which 
can well make a man sle98less, and yet Abraham is not what 
he is without this dread. 
There was no outward sign to indicate that one really did act under 
the "teleological suspension of the ethical" which intensified the 
dread the religious man felt when he acted. It was precisely through 
the dread that the "Knight of Faith" knew he had acted according to 
faith and not on the aesthetic level. His only recourse was to faith 
-and faith was always complex or problematic. 91 "Faith is always 
related to that which is not seen in the context of nature (physically 
contracted) to the invisible [unsynlige], in the spiritual context 
(spiritually) to the improbable [usandsynlige]." 92 For this reason, 
to be a Christian was difficult. 
Anxiety, paradox and other elements of the Christian's ex-
perience were beneficia 1 because they caused the i ndi vi dua 1 to turn 
inward and through these elements realized ones need for faith which 
went beyond the objective to the be 1 i ef in God. One had to be 1 i eve 
90
s0ren Kierkegaard, Fear and Trembling, op. cit., p. 41. 
91 Gonzalez, op. cit., p. 338. S.K. suggested that the 
"teleological suspension of the ethical" was the necessary result 
of heeding absolute obedience to God. This contravened the "cat-
egori ca 1 imperative" which rose up out of the uni versa 1 as described 
and established by Kant. 
92 Hong and Hong, op. cit., Vol. 2, p. 10. 
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in God because God was an object of religious faith rather than phil-
osophical or rationalistic apprehension. God needed to be experienced 
rather than simply perceived. It was Kierkegaard's feeling that those 
with philosophical and theological proofs for God were really in-
terested in having the paradox eliminated and having everything 
brought to a synthetic reconciliation. 93 Kierkegaard defended paradox; 
One should not think slightingly of the paradoxical, for the 
paradox is the source of the thinkers passion, and the thinker 
without a 1;1aradox is 1 ike a 1 over without fee 1 i ng: a paltry 
mediocrity )~4 
There was a right way to prove God's existence, "for one 
proves his presence by an expression of submission, which may assume 
various forms according to the customs of the country - and thus it 
also proves God's existence by worship ... not by proofs." 95 Kier-
kegaard gave no speci a 1 advantage to those of great i nte 11 ectua 1 
ability. All needed to remain submissive to the paradox. Thus, he 
felt that he had made men equally able to stand before God. To stand 
before God was to stand before the absurd, that which cannot be fully 
comprehended. 
93carnell, op. cit., p. 73. 
94s¢ren Kierkegaard, [Johannes Climacus], Philosophical Frag-
ments, trans. David Swenson, Intro. and commentary by Niels Thulstup, 
trans. revised and commentary translated by Howard V. Hong (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 1936, 1962), p. 46. 
95s¢ren Kierkegaard, Postscript, p. 485. 
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To keep his soul fixed upon the absurd; it is comparatively 
more di ffi cult for a man if he has much understanding - if 
one will keep in mind that not everyone who has lost his under-
standing over Christianity thereby proves he has any. . . . 
Every man, the wisest and the simplest, can qualitatively . 
. . distinquish just as essentially between what he under-
stands and what he does not understand . . . and he can 
discover that there is something which is, in spite of the 
fact that it is against his understanding and way of 
thinking.96 
As an individual moved toward Christianity the goal Kier-
kegaard set out for him was "eternal happiness." 97 This goal, while 
in the highest realm of the religious sphere, was to be strived for 
through the transformation of the individual by pathos. 98 "In relation 
to an eternal happiness as the absolute good, pathos is not a matter 
of words, but of permitting this conception to transform the entire 
existence of the individua1. 99 Kierkegaard proposed three conditions 
for the transformation of the individual by pathos. 100 
Resignation was named as the first condition. Through re-
signationthe single individual liberatedhimself from finite goals and 
confronted the eterna 1 . "But if, as a result of the inspection, 
resignation finds nothing in the way, it is a sign that in the moment 
96s~ren Kierkegaard, Postscript, op. cit., p. 495. 
97 -Ibid., p. 323. 
98Gregor Malantschuk, Kierkegaard's Thought (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 1971), p. 293. 
99s~ren Kierkegaard, Postscript, op. cit., p. 347. 
100Malantschuk, op. cit., p. 293. 
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of inspection the individual does have a relationship to an eternal 
happiness." 101 For the religious man it meant, "the dying away from 
the life of immediacy while still remaining in the finite." 102 This 
cannot be enough for the religious man. He not only chooses the 
absolute but inwardly appropriated the absolute as his own. 103 
When the individual began to appropriate the absolute he dis-
covered he was st i 11 bound to his re 1 at i ve goa 1 s. When he tried to 
extricate himself from this immediacy, suffering became the con-
sequence and he rea 1 i zed his attachment of the tempera 1 was the 
f d t . f h. ff . 104 oun a 1on o 1s su er1ng. The realization that the infinite 
and the tempora 1 cannot be media ted was true to the i ndi vi dua 1' s 
experience, but fell short of the ideal. This realization produced 
suffering for the existing individual, and so religious suffering re-
mained inevitable. The inevitability of religious suffering served 
as evidence to the existing i ndi vi dua 1 and to God that the self was 
aware of its guilt (the result of inability to mediate the infinite 
and the tempera 1) and its determination to come to grips with i~t. 105 
101
s0ren Kierkegaard, Postscript, op. cit., p. 354. Res-
ignation, while little recognized as the first conditi'on, is spoken 
of by S.K. more extensively i.n his "Fear and Trembling" as "infinite 
resignation" in relation to Abraham. S.K. again refers to resignation 
in the Postscript but only marginally (p. 497). 
102
s0ren Kierkegaard, Postscript, op. cit., p. 386. 
103Malantschuk, op. cit., p. 294. 104Ibid. 
105
carnell, op. cit.,.pp. 133-135. Suffering, in a religious 
sense, has meaning only when it is experienced in daily life. See 
Concluding Unscientific Postscript, pp. 386-393. 
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Resignation was the first condition of transformation, suf-
fering the second, and guilt the third. Guilt became critical for 
the religious sphere because it was a concrete expression of 
existence. 106 Gui 1 t was not thought of in terms of quantity, (that 
is, the more you are gui 1 ty the more gui 1 t you have) but gui 1 t was 
present for the individual upon the first offense, the experience of 
dread. The experience of dread was the discovery of one's gui 1 t and 
loss of innocence. 
For human justice pronounces a life sentence only for the 
third offense, but eternity pronounces sentence the first time 
forever. He is caught forever harnessed with the yoke· of 
guilt, and never gets out of the harness. . . . 107 
Kierkegaard saw admission of guilt as crucial to the religious 
stage but felt that the admission of "essential guilt" was necessary 
to bring into actuality authentic existence for the individual. Es-
sential guilt is that guilt which one experiences and continues to 
experience as the result of his realization that he was not able to 
mediate the eterna 1 • The standard by which one knew he was guilty 
did not stand outside the exister {as it did in the comparative con-
sciousness of guilt) but was within inwardness. 108 "The consciousness 
106 Ib"d 76 1 • ' p. . 
107 s~ren Kierkegaard, Postscript, op. cit., p. 475. See also 
pages 471-473 for a detailed descnption of "totality - qualification" 
of guilt in the religious sphere. 
108s~ren Kierkegaard, Postscript, op. cit., p. 473. 
53. 
of guilt is the decisive expression for existential pathos in relation 
to an eternal hap pi ness. ,l 09 
The Kierkegaardian concept of essential guilt took one a long 
way into the sphere of the religious. However Kierkegaard felt that 
the consciousness of essential guilt still lay in immanence, dis-
tinquishing it from the consciousness of sin. Immanence was regarded 
by Kierkegaard as an expression for Hegel's affirmation that thought 
and being are one, that the objective was the subjective and that 
thought or reason permeates all things. For Kierkegaard, this notion 
of immanence excludes all thoughts of transcendence. 110 This concept 
of immanence does not truly reflect reality, for human existence con-
tains paradox and thought cannot penetrate paradox. The consciousness 
of essential guilt lay in immanence because while it lay in relation-
ship to eternal happiness it was not decisive for the individual. 
Thought was able to· penetrate e~ential guilt and bring it into under-
standing. Thought cannot penetrate the absurd or the paradox, there-
fore paradox is decisive for the exister. Only when the self is in 
relation to the paradox/absurd can the individual not escape the 
responsibility of seeing itself in relation to God, the absolute. 
That is to say, the consciousness of sin still lies es-
sentially in immanence, in distinction from the consciousness 
109Ib'd 474 1 • ' p. . 
110
walter Lowrie, Kierkegaard (London: Oxford University 
Press, 1938) Appendix VII -"transcendence." 
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of sin. In the consciousness of guilt it is the selfsame 
subject which becomes essentially guilty by keeping guilt in 
relationship to an eternal happiness, but yet the identity of 
the subject is such that gui 1 t does not make the subject a 
new man, which is the characteristic of the breach. But the 
breach, in which lies the paradoxical accentuation, cannot 
occur in the relationship between an exister and the eternal, 
because the eterna 1 embraces the exi ster on a 11 sides, and 
therefore the disrelationship or incompatability remains 
within immanence.lll 
It was immanence witlrin guilt that corrupted and limited the self. 
Even though the self may be fraught with guilt he was ab 1 e to avoid 
the responsibility of seeing itself in relation to God, the absolute. 112 
Essential guilt was not decisive for the individual. 
Kierkegaard felt required to fulfill his responsibility to his 
vocation; that is to cause man to become an individual Christian. 
Therefore he pushed man into accepting the responsibility of coming 
into a re 1 at ion with God the abso 1 ute. He used dread, dread of the 
good to fulfill this mission. Dread of the good was discovered in 
the consciousness of the religious when the r.eligious realized it's 
ethi ca 1 duty 113 was 1 ove. The self shrank from the res pons i bi 1 ity 
of love because love called for the "non-judgemental sharing of life 
with life" which removed the self from the center. 114 The result of 
111 s~ren Kierkegaard, Postscript, op. cit., p. 474. 
112
carnell, op. cit., p. 78. 
11 \ierkegaard made use of k'antian duty in his ethical con-
cepts to describe the obligation of the individual Christian. 
114
carnell, op. cit., p. 78. 
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shrinking away from the responsibility of love was dread of the good. 
When dread of the good appeared in the consciousness the exister had 
evidence within him that he was a sinner. Again the religious 
individual was confronted with the exhausting task of mediating the 
eternal in time. 
Kierkegaard has helped the existing individual realize he was 
a sinner. Sin was 1 inked to two exi stenti a 1 concepts: ( 1) that 
finitude issues in moral ethical despair, and 
subjectivity. 11115 
(2) that "Truth is 
Sin is this: before God, or with the conception of God, 
to be in despair at not willing to be oneself, or in despair 
at willing to be oneself. Thus sin is potentiated weakness 
or potentiated defiance: sin is the potentiation of despair.ll6 
The first concept to which sin was linked generally accompanied 
flagrant transgressions of the law or universal while the second ac-
companied the more subtle arrogance of self-righteousness, 117or was an 
offense to the absolute. 
S.K. made it clear in his little book 11 The Sickness Unto 
Death" that the sickness of the sinner is despair and is "unto death." 
115 Ib"d 79 1 • ' p. . 
116s~ren Kierkegaard, Sickness Unto Death, op. cit., p. 208. 
117carnell, op. cit., p. 79. 
56. 
He had already stated that "despair is sin;" 118 
So a 1 so we can demonstrate the eterna 1 in man from the 
fact that despair cannot consume his self, that this precisely 
is the torment of contradiction in despair. If there were 
nothing eternal in a man, he could not despair; but if despair 
could consume his self, there would still be no despair. 
Thus it is that desP.air, this sickness in the self, is 
the sickness unto death.ll9 
The experience of despair for man was grounded in his "essential 
failure to live with singleness of mind toward that which is absolute. 
Relief from despair comes only when the self is so governed by 
eternity that a radical transformation of the self results." 120 This 
transformation took place through love. 
That which really makes a man despair is not misfortune, 
but it is the fact that he 1 acks the eterna 1; despair is to 
1 ack the eterna 1; despair consists in not having undergone 
the change of eternity by duty's "shalt." Consequently 
despair is not the 1 oss of the be 1 oved, that is misfortune, 
pain, suffering; but despair is the lack of the eternal. 
For when it becomes impossible to possess the beloved in the 
temporal existence, then eternity says, "Thou shalt love," 
that is, eternity saves love from despairing just by making 
it eternal .... And when eternity says, "Thou shalt love," 
then it assumes the responsibility for guaranteeing that it 
can be done.l21 
118
s0ren Kierkegaard, Sickness Unto Death, op. cit., p. 240. 
Carnell in his book, Burden of S0ren Kierkegaard, recapitualtes three 
elements of sin important to S.K. 1. Sin is located in a defiant 
will 2. Sin is an existence- determinant 3. The possibility 
of sin increases the possibility of intellectual offence, p. 80. 
119Ibid., pp. 153-154. 
120
carnell, op. cit., p. 81. 
121
s0ren Kierkegaard, Works of Love, trans. David F. Swenson 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1946), pp. 34-35. 
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a. Religiousness A and B 
There remained one more mode of existence between the ex-
perience of despair and the "specifically Christian" religiousness 
which was characterized by the paradoxical and the absurd concept of 
God in time. 122 This barrier or element Kierkegaard called reli-
giousness A while the ultimate or absolute religiousness was labeled 
religiousness B. The term immanent (A) and transcendent (B) indicated 
the distinctives existant between the two different forms of the 
l . . 123 re 1g1ous. 
Religiousness A was characterized by immanence. The 
individual within religiousness A was "inwardly defined by self-
annihilation before God," 124 and thus acknowledged his total 
impotence. The individual within religiousness A was not far from 
the kingdom but he did fall short of true Christianity as exemplified 
by religiousness B. 
While it was possible for religiousness A to exist in paganism; 
For of religiousness A one may say that, even if it has not 
been exemplified in paganism, it could have been, because it 
has only human nature in general as its assumption.l25 
122Malantschuk, op. cit., p. 297. 
123swenson, op. cit., p. 135. 
124s¢ren Kierkegaard, Postscript, p. 496. 
125 Ibid., p. 497. 
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It is also possible for it to be the "religiousness of everyone who 
is not decisively Christian, whether he be baptized or no." 126 "Reli-
giousness A must first be present in the individual before there can 
be any question of becoming aware of the dialectic of 8." 127 Reli-
. A . d d t t Ch . t. . t 128 g1ousness was cons1 ere as a preparatory s ep o r1s 1an1 y 
(or religiousness B). 
Religiousness A was dominated by the ethical-religious demands 
of Christianity. Religiousness B was "dependent upon the saving work 
of Christ, offered to the person who has exhausted his own pos-
sibilities."129 
The defective element in religiousness A was it's inability 
to go far enough. It remained a "heartfelt expression of a sense of 
God," but was not "conditioned by a definite something." 130 
Religiousness A makes the thing of existing as strenuous 
as possible (outside the paradox-religious sphere), but it 
does not base the relation to an eternal happiness upon one's 
existence but lets the relation to an eternal happiness serve 
as basis for the transformation of existence.l3l 
126s0ren Kierkegaard, Postscript, op. cit., p. 495. 
---....!..--
127 Ib"d 494 1 • ' p. . 
128Malantschuk, op. cit., p. 297. 
129Ibid., p. 298. 
130carnell, op. cit., p. 82. 
131 s0ren Kierkegaard, Postscript, op. cit., p. 509. 
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Kierkegaard thought that Socrates' ignorance, and the Socratic 
practice of gazing off into space as a form of communication with the 
divine was the best example of religiousness A. 132 
But how was one to bring himself to the place where he would 
be ready and successful in going beyond religiousness A? For Kier-
kegaard the answer was to be found in the bib 1 i ca 1 doctrine/ account 
of the incarnation. This was evidenced in S. K. 's concept of the 
paradox. "The paradox consists principally in the fact that God, the 
Eternal, came into existence in time as a particular man." 133 Kier-
kegaard called this paradox the "absolute paradox" because he felt 
that through it, he had estab 1 i shed: (1) the uniqueness of Chris-
tianity (2) the necessity of the "leap" of faith and (3) the want 
of any advantage in being rationally clever. 134 
Simply stated, the absolute paradox was the fact that God 
became man. This was an impossibility yet it occurred. To exist 
132swenson, Something About Kierkegaard, op. cit., p. 135. 
Religiousness A can also be thought of as the religion of Socrates 
while religiousness B as the religion of Jesus. Both are existential 
in their approach to God. They both are mai euti c in methodo 1 ogy and 
their s i gni fi cance 1 ay in their ability to do something to or bring 
about transformation in persons. However Socrates assumes that truth 
is present within every human being. It is simply the duty of the 
teacher (Socrates) to evoke it from man with mai eut i cs and irony. 
Jesus is the only one able to transform in totality the being of 
another person. God (truth) is not in man but rather comes to man 
through Christ. Jesus is the teacher and Saviour who transforms man. 
Tillich, op. cit,. pp. 171-172 and Livingston, op. cit., pp. 316-320. 
These concepts are addressed by S.K. primarily in the Philosophical 
Fragments. 
133s0ren Kierkegaard, Postscript, op. cit., p. 529. 
134
carnell, op. cit., p. 83. 
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Christianity was to live in relation to the absolute paradox. 
Whenever one reasons in this fashion: "One cannot stop 
at the paradox because this is too small a task or too easy 
and indolent," then one must reply: "No, on the contrary, it 
is exactly the opposite, it is the most difficult thing of 
all, day in and day out, to relate oneself to something upon 
which bases one's eternal happiness, holding fast to the pas-
sion with which one understands that one cannot understand, 
especially as it is so easy to let this go in the illusion 
that now one has understood it. 135 
Religiousness B was· the greatest mode of existence the individual 
could acquire. Because of its transcendent nature it bound man to 
it as he was no 1 onger in the rea 1m of the immanent. Although S. K. 
said he never attained this level he wished it passionately for his 
reader. 136 
If the individual is paradoxically dialectic, every 
vestige of original immanence being annihilated and all con-
nection cut off, the individual being brought to the utmost 
verge of existence, then we have the paradoxical reli-
giousness. This paradoxi ca 1 inwardness is the greatest pos-
sible, for even the most paradoxical determinant, if after 
all it is within immanence, leaves as it were a possibility 
of escape, of a 1 eapi ng away, of a retreat into the eterna 1 
behind it; it is as though everything had not been staked 
after a 11. But the breach makes the inwardness the greatest 
possible.l37 -
The transition between religiousness A and religiousness B 
occurred for the individual when he moved from one type of guilt con-
sci ousness. The first type of gui 1 t consciousness was described in 
135
s¢ren Kierkegaard, Postscript, op. cit., p. 496 (n.) 
136Ibid., p. 495. S.K. stated here that he felt he had only 
attained the level of religiousness A but that he found this difficult 
enough. 
137 Ibid., p. 507. 
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"The Concept of Anxiety." This type of guilt caused the individual 
to see his own possibilities in the face of the guilt of the whole 
race. The second type of guilt-consciousness was set forth in the 
"Concluding Unscientific Postscript" where man saw his own impotence 
in the face of the eternal ethical requirement which resulted in his 
own inwardacknowledgment of his own absolute guilt. 138 To become 
part of religiousness B required the single individual to "understand 
what it means to break thus with the understanding and with thinking 
and with immanence, in order to lose the last foothold of immanence, 
eternity behind one, and to exist constantly on the extremest v·erge 
of existence by virtue of the absurd." 139 
When one had reached the realm of religiousness B and was 
existing within it he was able to experience the expression of 
authentic faith because the self passionately and existentially be-
lieved in opposition to his own understanding and thereby came into 
relation with the absolute paradox. 14° Kierkegaard has made it clear 
that once one has reached religiousness B he had not arrived but still 
is constantly becoming, for the most difficult thing man could do was 
to exist in relation to the absolute paradox. It was through the 
activity of existing only, that caused one to become eternal. 141 
138Malantschuk, op. cit., p. 299. 
139
s0ren Kierkegaard, Postscript, op. cit., p. 505. 
140carnell, op. cit., p. 84. 
141
s0ren Kierkegaard, Postscript, op. cit., p. 508. 
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The existence of the self within religiousness B was 
determined by the confrontation of the self with the absolute paradox. 
The possi b 1 il i ty of an expression of faith was raised through the 
confrontation, and the awakened self enthusiastically leaped into the 
mysteries of the eternal. 142 The leap into the eternal had some risk 
attached. However, "without risk there is no faith:" 143 
Faith is precisely the contradiction between the infinite 
passion of the individual's inwardness and the objective un-
certainity. If I am capable of grasping God objectively, I 
do not believe, but precisely because I cannot do this I must 
believe. If I wish to preserve myself in faith I must con-
stantly be intent upon holding fast the.objective uncertainity, 
so as to remain out upon the deep, over seventy thousand 
fathoms of water, still preserving my faith.l44 
And such was the task of the individual in religiousness B. Kier-
kegaard felt that it was a task attainable and performable by all: 
"First of all, everybody can become a Christian." 145 
The existence spheres have been important to Kierkegaardi an 
understanding. He recapitualted the spheres so that the reader would 
be able to see the task clearly before him. 
Immediacy, the aesthetic, finds no contradiction in the 
fact of existing: to exist is one thing, and the con-
tradiction is something else which comes from without. The 
ethical finds the contradiction, but within self-assertion. 
The religiousness A comprehends the contradiction as suffering 
in self-annihilation, although within immanence, but by 
142carnell, op. cit., p. 86. 
143s~ren Kierkegaard, Postscript, op. cit., p. 182. 
144 Ibid. 
145 Ibid., p. 520. 
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ethically accentuating the fact of existing it prevents the 
exister from becoming abstract in immanence, or from becoming 
abstract by wishing to remain in immanence. The paradoxical 
religiousness breaks with immanence and makes the fact of 
existing the absolute contradiction, not within immanence, 
but against immanence. There is no 1 onger any immanent fund-
amental kinship between the temporal and the eternal, because 
the eternal itself has entered time and would constitute there 
the kinship.l46 
146 Ibid., pp. 507-508. 
CHAPTER FOUR 
TRUTH IS SUBJECTIVITY 
The concept of abso 1 ute paradox was centra 1 to Ki erkegaard' s 
thought. The counterpart to that theme was Ki erkegaard' s concept, 
"truth is subjectivity." This phrase was not intended to imply that 
there were not truths outside of the knower. 1 Rather, Kierkegaard was 
concerned with religious truth (faith) and it was this truth that was 
subjectivity. Ki erkegaard wished to avoid any misconceptions that 
would make of religious truth an object of empirical knowledge. To 
suggest such a thing would remove the existing individual from his 
existential task, the appropriation of religious truth. 
A. Objective/Subjective 
Kierkegaard felt that the best way to recognize the positive 
was through the negative. 2 The objective therefore became the negative 
mirror by which Kierkegaard could reflect the subjective. It was 
against objectivity that Kierkegaard reacted because of it's lack of 
passionate inwardness. The objective was thought of as out there, 
1James C. Livingston, Modern Christian Thought (New York: Mac-
millan Pub. Co. Inc., 1971), p. 320. 
2s~ren Kierkegaard, [Johannes Climacus], Concluding Un-
scientific Postscript, trans. David F. Swenson and Walter Lowrie 
(Princeton: Princeton Unversity Press, 1941), p. 474. 
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and was perceived without the interplay of feeling as opinion. 3 Kier-
kegaard's distaste for the objective lay not in the reality of ob-
jective fact but rather with the ease by which one may appropriate 
the objective in the absence of any personal involvement. The 
objective was obvious all around, but when objectivity replaced the 
subjective in Christianity (a religion of faith) Kierkegaard's anger 
was kindled. Christianity was not an object for science to dissect 
but was a religion of faith that demanded the existing individual 
believe against his understanding and exist in relation to the 
absolute paradox which required his full being.· 
The absolute paradox or the incarnation was an objective fact. 
Kierkegaard accepted this, but insisted that the objective remained 
meaningless until it impacted the individual. The impact was the 
individual's responsibility, for "the subjective acceptance is pre-
cisely the decisive factor." 4 Kierkegaard's concern with the objective 
rose out of his observation of Christendom in which man became dispas-
sionate because of objectivity. "Objective thinking does not care 
at a 11 about the thinker and finally becomes so objective that, 1 ike 
the customs clerk, it thinks that it merely has to do the writing, 
that the others have to do the reading." 5 
3E.J. Carnell, The Burden of S0ren Kierkegaard (Grand Rapids: 
Eerdmans, 1965), p. 110. 
4
s0ren Kierkegaard, Postscript, op. cit. p. 116. 
5Howard V. Hong and Edna H. Hong, ed. trans., S0ren Ki er-
kegaard's Journals and Papers IV (Bloomington: Indiana Un1vers1ty 
Press, 1975), p. 347. 
66. 
S.K.'s singular use of the term objective differed somewhat 
with the contemporary usuage. Objective, especially in the realm of 
thought, was abstract, that is, it v1as ab 1 e to be camp 1 eted and was 
about things in the world and not oneself. The subjective by contrast, 
caul d not be camp 1 eted but was a h-1ays becoming, true to its ex-
istential nature. 6 Kierkegaard illustrated the manner in which he 
meant the word objective. 
The existing individual who chooses to pursue the ob-
jective way enters upon the entire approximation-process by 
which it is proposed to bring God to light objectively. But 
this is in all eternity impossible, because God is a subject 
and therefore exists only for subjectivity in inwardness.? 
To be objective meant to be disinterested "infinitely, personally and 
passionately," with that which happens to individuals. 8 
Kierkegaard freely admitted that Christianity was based on 
a series of objective historical events, 9 but he did not concede 
Christianity to the objective. 
It is subjectivity that Christianity is concerned with, 
and it is only in subjectivity that its truth exists, if it 
exists at all; objectively, Christianity has absolutely no 
existence. If its truth happens to be in only a single sub-
ject, ·it exists in him alone; and there is greater Christian 
6Groff and Mi 11 er , The Shaping of Modern Christi an Thought, 
(Cleveland and New York: The World Pub. Co., 1968), p. 371. 
7
s0ren Kierkegaard, Postscript, op. cit., p. 178. 
8
rbid., pp. 23-24. 
9Ibid., pp. 508-512. 
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joy in heaven over this one individual than over universal 
history and the System, which as objective entities are incom-
mensurable for that which is Christian.lO 
Therefore, to validatethe historical data (through science,archaeology, 
etc.) of Christianity was useless in establishing the essential truth 
of Christianity. A Christian was able to rest in the objectivity of 
the historical facts and not mediate the truth of Christianity in the 
self. 11 · He was able to live his life as usual and do nothing about 
the objective facts, remaining unchanged in their presence. 
The answer to this tranquil but meaningless mode of existence 
was to come through the transformation of the existing individual. 
The transformation of the individual was contingent upon there-
orientation of the self in its relation to the truth. 12 
When the question of truth is raised inan objective man-
ner, reflection is directed objectively to the truth, as an 
object to which the knower is related. Reflection is not 
focused upon the relationship, however, but upon the question 
of whether it is the truth to which the knower is related. 
If only the object to which he is related is the truth, the 
subject is accounted to be in the truth. When the question 
of the truth is raised subjectively, reflection is directed 
subjectively to the nature of the individual 1 S relationship; 
if only the mode of this relationship is in the truth, the 
individual is in the truth even if he should happen to be thus 
related to what is not true.l3 
10Ibid., p. 116. 11 carnell, op. cit., p. 116. 
12Kierkegaard felt the reason why man did not presently under-
stand the 11 right 11 (subjective) concept of the truth was the fault of 
speculative philosophy, the result of Hegelian systematic. Spec-
ulative phi 1 osophy and objectivity are used synonomously, the 1 atter 
describing the former. Thus, while speculative philosophy may tech-
nically be another category for the discussion of truth, a discussion 
of the objective adequately addresses the issue. See Postscript, 
pp. 49-55. 
13
s0ren Kierkegaard, Postscript, op. cit., p. 178. 
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It was made clear by S.K. in the footnote for this passage~ that the 
truth he was speaking about was essential or eternal truth which was 
"related to existence." 14 
While objectivity failed for Kierkegaard because it did not 
engage the individual passionately through inwardness~ it also failed 
because it did not confront the absolute. Objective, historical in-
formation, no matter how much~ could never come to an absolute cer-
tainty or provide irrefutable proof. All it could do was come to an 
approximation and no more. 15 The historian or objective thinker was 
ab 1 e to suggest Christianity as a prob 1 em of thought but could not 
address its truths~ for "Christianity on the contrary is subjective; 
the inwardness of faith in the believer constitutes the truth's 
eternal decision .... Christianity is inwardness." 16 
Ki erkegaard felt that those who espoused objectivity as a 
methodology by which one was to arrive at the (eternal) truth had con-
fused knowledge with faith. 
In this objectivity one tends to lose that infinite personal 
interestedness in passion which is the condition of faith, 
the ubi que et nusquam in which faith can come into being. 
Has anyone who previously had faith gained anything with re-
spect to its strength and power? No~ not in the 1 east. 
Rather is it the case that in this voluminous knowledge~ this 
certainty that 1 urks at the door of faith and threatens to 
14Ibid. 
15s~ren Kierkegaard~ Postscript~ op. cit.~ p. 31. 
16 Ibid, p. 201. 
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devour it, he is in so dangerous a situation that he will need 
to put forth much effort in great fear and tremb 1 i ng, 1 est 
he fall a victim to the temptation to confuse knowledge with 
faith .... For if passion is eliminated, faith no longer 
exists, and certainty and passion do not go together. Whoever 
believes that there is a God and an over-ruling providence 
finds it easier to preserve his faith easier to acquire some-
thing that definitely is faith and not an illusion, in an im-
perfect world where passion is kept alive, than in an 
absolutely perfect world. In such a world faith is in fact 
unthinkable.l7 
Objective reality, for the individual, was not to be desired. 
Kierkegaard asked him simply to respond to the action required by 
objective realities. The proper response was not "What is this?" but 
should be "What may I do about this?" 18 The objective did not pre-
determine what the action of the subjective should be. The two are 
entirely distinct. The objective merely required that action be 
taken. The subjective decided through passionate inwardness what that 
action would be. Decision could only rise up out of freedom which 
necessarily existed in the subjective only. Objectivity became 
d 1 t t b . t . . t 19 Th . d. . d 1 t b sec on ary as a resu o su JeC 1 v1 y. e 1 n 1 v1 ua mus ecome 
aware of his freedom and his total responsibility for his own actions. 
When the i ndi vi dua 1 possessed this awareness then he knew that the 
objective had dropped off and that he was gripped with the deci-
siveness of subjectivity. 
17 Ibid., p. 30. 
18Louis Mackey, Kierkegaard, A Kind of Poet (Philadelphia: 
University of Pennsylvania Press, 1971), p. 173. 
19 Ibid. 
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Becoming subjective suggested that one was on the way to the 
discovery of truth. The desire to enter subjectivity was to rise up 
out of the individual's realization that one's illusion of self-
sufficiency was entirely false. The resultant despair caused the in-
dividual to become dependent upon God. 20 It is subjectivity that 
Christianity is concerned with, and it is only in subjectivity that 
its truth exists. 21 
The question S.K. wished to confront in his "Concluding Un-
scientific Postscript " asked: "How can eternal truth be appropriated 
by one who exists and thinks in time?" 22 The first thing he rejected 
as a solution was the Hegelian23 resolution (synthesis) of the thesis 
and antithesis. The only answer was to become subjective in one's 
search for the truth. Because the individual was finite, he was not 
able to conform his temporal existence to the eternal idea. Kier-
kegaard felt, however, that the existing individual could appropriate 
20carnell, op. cit., p. 121. 
21 s~ren Kierkegaard, Postscript, op. cit., p. 116. S.K. also 
argued with objectivity and its exponents concept of 1-am-I which pro-
posed that man step outside of the self to discover through empirical 
observation the objective reality of his being. Postscript, p. 176. 
22Mackey, op. cit., p. 180. This question was really for-
mulated and addressed on one level in the Philosophical Fragments. 
In the Postscript, S.K. continued the discussion carrying 1t deeper 
into the life of the individual. He stated "The subjective problem 
concerns the relationship of the individual to Christianity," wherein 
is the truth (Postscript, p. 20). It is, of course, S.K.'s pseudonym 
that addressed the problem (Johannes Climacus). 
23Hegelianism, speculative philosophy, objectivity, while all 
i nter-re 1 ated were the three enemies or detractors of the truth and 
thus suffered the polemical attacks of S.K. 
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the eterna 1 truth. The constant striving for and dedication to the 
eterna 1 truth a 11 owed the exi ster to 1 i ve the ide a by a 11 owing the 
idea to live within him. 24 There was to be no other truth that man 
could know. Moments of passion within the individual caused the truth 
to be realized, thus; "truth is subjectivity." "It is only mo-
mentarily that the particular individual is able to realize 
existentially a unity of the infinite and the finite which transcends 
existence. This unity is realized in the moment of passion." 25 
1. Passion 
Passion for Kierkegaard was " ... the highest expression of 
subjectivity." 26 If an existing individual had passion he had removed 
the stain of objectivity. "In absolute passion the individual is in 
the very extremity of his subjectivity, as a consequence of his having 
reflected himself out of every external relativity." 27 The depth of 
the passion cannot be determined by a third party. He may "understand 
him only generally with respect to the object of his passion, "28 but 
the third party cannot understand him in the absoluteness of his 
passion. 
24Mackey, op. cit., p. 181. 
25s~ren Kierkegaard, Postscript, op. cit., p. 176. 
26 Ibid., p. 178. 
27 Ibid., p. 454. 
28Ibid., p. 455. 
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The experience of passion was not greater than the discovery 
of eternal truth but was the expression of inwardness whereby eternal 
truth could be realized. "In passion the existing subject is rendered 
infinite in the eternity of the imaginative representation," 29 and is 
closest to the eternal truth for "God is a subject, and therefore 
exists only for subjectivity in inwardness." 30 Man can only know the 
truth through himself· where passion and inwardness must abound, for 
"subjectively the truth exists for them [man] in inwardness, because 
the decisiveness of the truth is rooted in the subjectivity of the 
individual." 31 
Subjectivity culminated in passion. Christianity was paradox. 
"Paradox and passion are a mutual fit." 32 The question was not which 
gave rise to the other, but: "what was the relationship between them?" 
"The existing individual has by means of the paradox itself come to 
be placed in the extremity of existence [passion]." 33 The relationship 
between the two became more intensive through the inwardness of the 
existing individual. When passion became an expression of the eternal 
the passion of the infinite was itself the truth. By virtue of the 
29s~ren Kierkegaard, Postscript, op. cit., p. 178. 
30 Ibid. 
31 Ibid., p. 195. 
32 Ibid., p. 206. 
33 Ibid. 
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passion involved; the truth could not be found objectively. 
2. Faith 
While passion was an inward expression of the eternal truth, 
Kierkegaard felt that one must move beyond passion. Passion signified 
the contradiction of ones existence, especially those felt emotionally 
between freedom and nature within the self. Paradox, which was in 
relationship with passion, indicated the contradictions experienced 
in thought. 34 Truth was the re 1 at ion between passionate inwardness 
and paradox. 
When subjectivity is truth, the conceptual determination 
of the truth must include an expression for the antithesis 
to objectivity, ... this expression will at the same time 
serve as an indication of the tension of the subjective in-
wardness. Here is such a definition of truth: An objective 
uncertainity held fast in an appropriation-process of the most 
passionate inwardness is the truth, the highest truth at-
tainable for an existing individual. At the point where the 
way swings off ... there objective knowledge is placed in 
abeyance . . The truth is precisely the venture which 
chooses an objective uncertainty with the passion of the 
infinite.35 
Ki erkegaard converted his definition of truth into a de-
scription of faith. As he had previously stated, subjectivity is 
truth. "By virtue of the relationship subsisting between the eternal 
truth and the existing individual, the paradox came into being." 36 The 
34Mackey, op. cit., p. 181. 
35s0ren Kierkegaard, Postscript, op. cit., p. 182. 
36 Ibid., p. 187. 
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paradox occurred when the eternal truth came into being in time. When 
the i ndi vi dua 1 is confronted with the truth as paradox then he is 
"gripped in the anguish and pain of sin, facing the tremendous risk 
of the objective insecurity, [then] the individual believes. But 
without risk no faith. "37 
Kierkegaard believed there was a God but he was not knowable 
through objective uncertainty. Instead the existence of God was a 
subjective certainty because of the absurdity; "and this absurdity, 
held fast in the passion of inwardness, is faith ... The absurd 
is - that the eternal truth has come into being in time, that God has 
come into being, has been born, has grown up, and so forth." 38 
It was within and because of the absurdity that faith took 
on an incredible sense. Faith was to believe in thatwhich Vv'as not 
understandable. "For the absurd is the object of faith, and the only 
object that can be believed." 39 Faith was in response to that which 
was beyond the objective, thus Johannes De Silentio remarked that 
"Faith is a miracle, and yet no man is excluded from it; for that in 
which all human life is unified is passion, and faith is a passion." 40 
37 Ibid., p. 188. 
38Ibid., p. 189. 
39 Ibid. 
40s~ren Kierkegaard, [Johannes De Silentio], Fear and 
Tremb 1 i ng, trans. Walter Lowrie (Garden City N.Y.: Doub 1 eday Anchor 
Books, 1954), p. 77. 
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It was precisely at this point that passion was related to faith. 
The "authentically human factor is passion ... the highest passion 
in man is faith." 41 
Ki erkegaard defined faith in a subjective fashion: "Faith is: 
that the self in being itself and in willing to be itse 1f is grounded 
transparently in God. 1142 He also equated his definition of truth with 
the expression of faith. While truth was defined as "an objective 
uncertainty held fast in an appropriation - process of the most pas-
. . d .. 43 s1onate 1nwar ness. "faith is precisely the contradiction 
between the infinite passion of the individual's inwardness and the 
objective uncertai nity. u 44 
The existing individual was not able to verify the existence 
of his faith through objective means. Since faith was equated with 
truth and truth was subjectivity, so was faith also subjective. To 
be able to verify one's own faith objectively required that one set 
aside his subjectivity in order to gaze inward upon his own under-
standing of faith. But the object of faith was the absurd, and since 
the absurd could, by nature, not be understood he learned that he no 
41 Ibid., p. 131. 
42
s0ren Kierkegaard, [Anti-Climacus], The Sickness Unto Death, 
trans. Walter Lowrie (Garden City N.Y.: Doubleday Anchor Books, 1954) 
p. 131. Kierkegaard felt that in order to define anything related 
to existence it must be defined subjectively. To offer an objective 
definition is to actually do less for the subject than no definition 
at a 11. 
43
s0ren Kierkegaard, Postscript, op. cit., p. 182. 
44 Ibid. 
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longer believed for he "almost knows, or as good as knows." 45 
The character of faith suggested that the absurd was the 
proper object for faith because the improbable requires belief while 
objective reasoning could reject it. "To believe against the under-
standing is something different, and to believe with the understanding 
cannot be done at all." 46 The nature of faith was to be seen in it 1 S 
activity. 
Faith always gives thanks, is always in peril of life, 
in this collision of finite and infinite which is precisely 
a moral danger for him who is a composite of both. The pro-
bable is therefore so little to the taste of a believer that 
he fears it most of all, since he well knows that when he 
clings to 4robabilities it is because he is beginning to lose 
his faith. 
Kierkegaard again wished to elucidate the nature of Faith by 
providing a description of its opposite or negative; sin. 
But too often it has been overlooked that the opposite 
of sin is not virtue, not by any manner of means. This is 
in part a pagan view which is content with a merely human 
measure and properly does not know what sin is, that all sin 
is before God. No, the opposite of sin is faith, as is 
affirmed in Rom. 14:23, "whatsoever is not of faith is sin." 
And for the whole of Christianity it is one of the most 
decisive definitions that the opposite of sin is not virtue 
but faith.48 
45 Ibid., p. 189. 
46 Ibid., p. 208. 
47 Ibid., pp. 208-209. 
48s~ren Kierkegaard, Sickness Unto Death, op. cit., p. 213. 
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This was the relationship between faith and sin. Kierkegaard defined 
sin as: "before God, or with the conception of God, to be in despair 
at not wi 11 i ng to be oneself, or in despair at wi 11 i ng to be one-
self."49 Faith was thought of as that condition of the self which 
frees from despair, was able to cast off speculation and objectivity 
to discover it's essence in the abso 1 uteness of God. Through this 
condition of faith the self became higher than the universal, a 
paradox. 5° 
Faith is precisely this paradox, that the individual as 
the particular is higher than the universal, is justified over 
against it, is not subordinate but superior - yet in such a 
way, be it observed, that it is the particular individual who, 
after he has been subordinated as the particular to the 
universal, now through the universal becomes the individual 
who as the particular is superior to the universal, for the 
fact that the individual as the particular stands in an 
absolute relation to the absolute.51 
As has been stated, Kierkegaard had no quarrel with the 
universal (objectivity) so long as it remained within the appropriate 
disciplines of formal logic, mathematics etc. The polemical nature 
of S.K. sprang forth when the objective/universal swallowed up reality 
and thus reduced the existing individual to objective material. 
"Truth is subjectivity" was denied and disinterestedness set in for 
49 Ibid., p. 208. 
50
carnell, op. cit., p. 126. 
51 s~ren Kierkegaard, Fear and Trembling, op. cit., p. 66. 
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the individual. 
Faith, the type of which Abraham possessed, rejected the 
universal in favor of living in relation to the absolute, for it was 
in such a relation only that faith can survive and increase. It was 
precisely the risk of living in such a relation that caused faith to 
increase. 52 It was the eternal character of "truth is subjectivity" 
that caused faith to break away from finitude and express itself to-
wards the abso 1 ute paradox. Abraham was ab 1 e to take Isaac up upon 
the mountain for a sacrifice because his faith was not limited tothe 
universal but stood in relation to the absolute. 
What a tremendous paradox faith is, a paradox which is capable 
of transforming a murder into a holy act well-pleasing to God, 
a paradox which gives Isaac back to Abraham, which no thought 
can master, because faith begins precisely there where 
thinking leaves off.53 
Abraham did not understand the reasons for taking such an action for 
he knew that doing such a thing stood in opposition to the ethical. 
But it was precisely at this point that faith could become active, 
when the understanding had given way. Abraham realized that God, the 
absolute, had given the command and he had nothing to gain and every-
thing to lose by a disputation with God. "He knew that it was God 
the Almighty who was trying him, he knew that it was the hardest 
sacrifice that could be required of him; but he knew also that no 
52s0ren Kierkegaard, Postscript, op. cit., p. 188. 
53s0ren Kierkegaard, Fear and Trembling, op. cit., p. 64. 
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sacrifice was too hard when God required it - and he drew the knife:• 54 
Because of his willful submission of the self to the absolute, Abraham 
was able to experience the peace of passionate, inward faith. 
Since faith was a passion, the self committed everything to 
the absoluteness of God. The self will become more willing to trust 
all, thus the more constant and productive faith became. No longer 
was he to be simply a member of a group or some superficial element 
of the universa1. 55 
Once the quality and the nature of faith was established, S.K. 
began to outline the task of faith. "Faith has in fact two ta-sks: 
to take care in every moment to discover the improbable, the paradox; 
and then to hold it fast with the passion of inwardness." 56 S.K. was 
not concerned particularily with the final activities of the existing 
individual that resulted in faith. Rather, it was the decisiveness 
of passionate inwardness, the affect that the passion of faith had 
upon the individual. The activity of the individual would be right 
if the self was purified through faith. The tasks of faith would in-
sure that the self would continue to be "becoming" and thus truth too 
would be "becoming" subjectively. 
54 Ibid., p. 36. 
55carnell, op. cit., p. 131. 
56
s0ren Kierkegaard, Postscript, op. cit., p. 209. 
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Not for a single moment is it forgotten that the subject 
is an existing individual, and that existence is a process 
of becoming, and that therefore the notion of the truth as 
identity of thought and being is a chimera of abstraction, 
in its truth only an expectation of the creature; not because 
the truth is not such an identity, but because the knower is 
an existing individual for whom the truth cannot be such an 
identity as long as he lives in time.57 
The acquisition of faith was no small matter for it required 
the surrender of unde~standing. The surrender came about through the 
existential situation, the confrontation with the infinite in time. 
To have faith one needed to first exist then "if you do not have 
faith, then at least believe that you will indeed come to have faith 
- and then you do have faith." 58 God presented the existing in-
dividual with the promise of eternal life (which he needed). It was 
the be 1 i ever who could experience the eterna 1 hap pi ness promised. 59 
'1t is precisely as a believer that he is infinitely interested in his 
eternal happiness, and it is in faith that he is assured of it."60 
B. Truth is Subjectivity: The Essence 
What has thus far been discussed may be thought of as the 
methodo 1 ogy by which one may come to the truth. Ki erkegaard thought 
57 Ibid., p. 176. 
58Hong and Hong, Journals, op. cit., (1970) Vol. 2, p. 20. 
59s0ren Kierkegaard, Postscript, op. cit., p. 20. 
60Ibid., p. 53. 
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of the way by which one came to the truth as important as the arrival, 
for the individual was constantly "becoming" along with the truth he 
unwittingly possessed through his own subjectivity. It was the task 
of bringing the existing individual to that realization in which S.K. 
was engaged. But what was the essence of the concept: "truth is sub-
jectivity?" 
"Whether truth is defined more empi rica lly, as the conformity 
of thought and being, or more idealistically, as the conformity of 
being with thought, it is, in either case, important carefully to note 
what is meant by being." 61 Being was not to be thought of as the 
ideal, essence etc. that are of an objective form. Rather being 
implied becoming, existence etc.: Thereby moving being into the realm 
of the subjective, existential. "Every qualification for which being 
[vaeren] is an essential qualification lies outside of immanental 
thought, consequently outside of logic." 62 
reality. 
Thought and being were not ab 1 e to come to conformity in 
As soon as the being which corresponds to the truth comes 
to be empi rica lly concrete, the truth is put in process of 
becoming, and is again by way of anticipation the conformity 
of thought with being. This conformity is actually realized 
for God, but it is not realized for any existin~ spirit, who 
is himself existentially in process of becoming.6 
61 Ibid., p. 169. 
62Hong and Hong, Journals, op. cit., (1967) Vol. 1, p. 80. 
63s~ren Kierkegaard, Postscript, op. cit., p. 170. 
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A 11 existence was in the process of becoming. Ki erkegaard regarded 
"becoming" as part of his "subjective reflection" which also was an 
empirical approach. That is, the empi rica 1 approach of persona 1 
experience. 
In subjective reflection the truth became a question of 
inwardness, of subjectivity. 64 "For a subjective reflection the truth 
becomes a matter of appropriation, of inwardness, of subjectivit~ and 
thought must probe more and more deeply into the subject and his 
subjectivity." 65 
Objective reflection and subjective reflection were the two 
options for the existing individual as to how one might regard the 
truth. Simply because of the fact that it was an existing individual 
who posed such a question the objective was rejected for the objective 
laid outside of existence. The "subjective reflection turns its at-
tention inwardly to the subject, and desires in this intensification 
of inwardness to realize the truth." 66 
The truth was never fi na 1 and comp 1 ete. It would have been 
if the individual were able to transcend himself. The individual was 
caught in time and was able to realize the eternal only momentarily 
through a union of the infinite and the finite in a moment of pas-
sion.67 The individual was still in existence but had glimpsed the 
64Groff and Miller, op. cit., p. 371. S.K. also regarded ob-
jective thought as synonymous with abstract thought. 
65
s0ren Kierkegaard, Postscript, op. cit., p. 171. 
66Ibid., p. 175. 67 Ibid., p. 176. 
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truth as potentiated through the passionate inwardness of the self. 
11 lt is passion of the infinite that is the decisive factor 
and not its content, for its content is precisely itself. In this 
manner subjectivity and the subjective 11 how" constitute the truth. 1168 
11 At its maximum this inward "how" is the passion of the infinite, and 
the passion of the infinite is the truth. But the passion of the 
infinite is precisely subjectivity, and thus subjectivity becomes the 
truth." 69 
Because "subjectivity is truth," paradox became a reality for 
truth objectively which in turn demonstrated that indeed subjectivity 
is truth. Ki erkegaard often used this technique of the negative to 
bring about the affirmative and he used it to describe the paradoxical 
character of truth. "The paradoxical character of the truth is its 
objective uncertainty: this uncertainty is an expression for the 
passionate inwardness, and this passion is precisely the truth." 70 
"The truth is a snare; you cannot get it without being caught your-
self; you cannot get the truth by catching it yourself but only by 
its catching you." 71 
68 rbid.' p. 181. 
69 Ibid. 
70 Ibid., p. 183. 
71 Hong and Hong, Journals, op. cit., Vol. 4, p. 503. 
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The paradoxical nature of truth was the result of man in time 
whi 1 e the truth was eterna 1. It was a tension between the infinite 
and the finite. God was the abso 1 ute paradox because of the in-
carnation and God was the eternal truth. 72 Man encountered the truth 
through the subjective experience of faith, but God directly gave the 
believer a full sense of certitude that he has encountered the truth. 
11 God is the object of the truth, and the medi urn by which the truth 
is known. 1173 
S.K. thought it was ridiculous to attempt to observe one• s 
way to God, the truth. Natural theology brought one no closer to God 
for God does not exist within his creation. 11 Nature is, indeed, the 
work of God, but only the handiwork is. directly present, not God. 1174 
In like manner, it was ridiculous to approach God through 
theistic proofs. 11 TO attempt to think one•s way to God is the supreme 
case of thoughtlessness.~~ 75 These sort of approaches to God result 
in nothing but paganism. The pagan thought he could approach God 
without any inwardness or subjectivity and it was precisely here that 
the truth lay. 
72s~ren Kierkegaard, Postscript, op. cit., p. 218. 
73Bernard Ramm, Varieties of Christian Apologetic (Grand 
Rapids: Baker Book House, 1961), p. 59. 
74s0ren Kierkegaard, Postscript, op. cit., p. 218. 
75Ramm, op. cit., p. 60. 
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God remained elusive, 11 precisely because He is the truth, and 
by being e 1 us i ve desires to keep man from error. 1176 Man was forced 
to seek for God. Whi 1 e he sought for God he reflected upon the 
reasons for such a search. This reflection caused him to realize that 
his own depravity was the barrier or the reason for God's elusiveness.77 
Once man has made this first admission or realization he has made his 
first step of inwardness, for 11 God is a subject and therefore exists 
only for subjectivity in inwardness.~~ 78 
God was able to be known only by the individual 11 Stripped 
naked 11 of all his previous thoughts and standing 11 precisely in his 
isolation before God. 1179 It was not the community that brought the 
truth, rather the individual found it through passionate inwardness 
in isolation, apart from the community. 11 In order to become aware 
of the truth it is necessary to have apartness ( 11 Chri st took him 
aside 11 ), apartness from the crowd. And this alone is sufficient to 
make a man anxious and more afraid than he is of death.~~ 80 
The individual who desired God, the truth, suffered great pain 
because he realized the dialectical difficulty of such a task. It 
was at that very instant that he had God 11 by virtue of the i nfi ni te 
passion of inwardness.~~ 81 
76
s0ren Kierkegaard, Postscript, op. cit., p. 218. 
77Ramm, op. cit., p. 60. 
78
s0ren Kierkegaard, Postscript, op. cit., p. 178. 
79 Ibid., p. 472. 
80Hong and Hong, Journals, op. cit., Vol. 4, p. 503. 
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The paradoxical finite and the infinite, the incarnate Christ 
the God/man, the eternal truth in time all made up "subjectivity is 
truth." Ki erkegaard rea 1 i zed that man would never understand this, 
and that was good for it drove man to God. God, the absolute ideal, 
could understand for "it is he who is outside of existence and yet 
in existence, who is in eternity forever complete, and yet includes 
all existence within himself- it is God." 82 
82 Ibid., p. 108. 
CHAPTER FIVE 
CONCLUSION 
A. S0ren Kierkegaard: The Father of Existentialism 
The impact of S0ren Kierkegaard's philosophy was little felt 
in his lifetime outside of his immediate influence in Copenhagen. 
It wasn't until the very early years of the twentieth century that 
Kierkegaard began to have his impact. 1t was directly after the first 
world war that Kierkegaard's philosophy became known throughout 
Europe. 1 Karl Barth contributed largely to this interest in S.K. 
through his incorporation of Kierkegaardian philosophy into his theo-
logical method. When Barth dropped his "bombshell" commentary on 
Romans in 19192 on the theological community, the movement commonly 
known as Nee-orthodoxy was born and an interest in Kierkegaardian 
thought was sparked. 3 
The force with which S.K.'s thought hit the twentieth century 
was obvious when one realized the influence Nee-orthodoxy had on this 
1LivingstoR, James C., Modern Christian Thought (New York: 
Macmillan Pub. Co., Inc., 1971), pp. 311-312. 
2Hordern, W. E., A Laymans Guide to Protestant Theo 1 ogy (New 
York: Macmillan Pub. Co., 1955), p. 130. 
3Tillich, Paul, A Complete History of Christian Thought (New 
York: Harper & Row Pub., 1968), see pp. 172-173 for a short summary 
of the thought relationship between S.K. and Karl Barth. 
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century. Some of the greatest contemporary theological thinkers were 
part of this movement. Such men as Barth, Bonhoeffer, Bultmann, 
Rei nho 1 d Niebuhr and others represented Neo-orthodoxy and were re-
sponsi b 1 e for it's prominence in modern thought and 1 ife. Kier-
kegaard largely shaped the spirit and basic motifs of dialectical 
theo 1 ogy by which Barth and other Neo-orthodox theo 1 ogi ans expressed 
themselves and did their work. Kierkegaardian dialectics became the 
sine qua non of Neo-orthodoxy theology. 
Kierkegaard has been regarded as the "Father of Modern 
Existentialism." 4 Existentialism permeated German, French and other 
European philosophies. Ki erkegaard would have appreciated the fact 
that existentialism first found expression in theology. However, the 
contemporary existential scene has used existential thought in 
atheistic secular philosophies as well as theological thought. Martin 
Heidegger largely secularized Kierkegaard's thought. The contemporary 
existentialists, Jean Paul Sartre5 and Camus, popularized existen-
tialism through their writings and novels which really resulted in 
a philosophy of despair and meaninglessness, far from S.K. 's hopes 
and intentions. It was Kierkegaard's intention that through 
existential interpretation Christianity would become meaningful for 
the believer. 
4 Rohde, Peter, "S~ren Kierkegaard: The Father of Existen-
tialism," Essays on Kierkegaard ed. Jerry H. Gill (Minneapolis: 
Burgess Pub. Co., 1969), p. 29. 
5
copleston, F.S.J. A History of Philosophy, Vol. 7, part II, 
(Garden City: Image Books, 1965), pp. 207, 210. 
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Kierkegaard's thought has resulted in both positive and 
negative effects in philosophy, theology and ultimately in life as 
lived by the individual. It would appear that much of what Ki er-
kegaard thought has been misinterpreted. Certainly it has been 
perverted from the original intent Kierkegaard had which was to bring 
man into relationship with God; not to deny the essential existence 
of God. While Kierkegaard may be faulted for some of the misinter-
pretation and perversion of his thought because of his insistent use 
of indirect communication and obscurity, much of the fault falls at 
the feet of those who would first deny God's existence and then come 
to Kierkegaardian existentialism. Kierkegaard made God his first 
presupposition and moved forward from there. If man did not find God 
it was because he lacked the passionate inwardness by which God was 
discovered subjectively. 6 Perhaps this was Kierkegaard's strength 
as well as weakness. We can say "yes" to some elements and "no" to 
other elements of his thought. 
B. Yes 
1. Kierkegaard sought to return the individual to a position 
of importance. Hegelian systematics had placed society above the in-
dividual, thus reducing individual responsibility and making anonymity 
in the world desirable. 
6s0ren Kierkegaard, [Johannes Climacus] Concluding Un-
scientific Postscript trans. D.F. Swenson and .W. Lowrie (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 1941), p. 485. 
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S.K. saw only the individual and felt this was a primary 
category. The mass removed the uniqueness of the individual and thus 
destroyed Christianity. 
Why did I make such a great, great fuss about the category 
of individuality? Very simply, through this and by this 
stands the cause of Christianity.? 
Spiritual superiority sees only single individuals. Alas, 
generally we human beings are sense-dominated - therefore, 
as soon as there is a gathering of people, the impression 
changes and we see an abstraction, the mass - and we become 
changed. 
But for God, the infinite spirit, all these millions who 
have lived and are living do not form a mass - he sees only 
single individuals.8 
The group had become the primary category. If there was to 
be a reformation in category the individual had to become the primary 
emphasis. People do not become Christians simply by belonging to a 
particular group. One can come to God only by a persona 1 appro-
priation of faith. This would insure the individual's respon-
sibility for his own spiritual well being. Christianity was not an 
all inclusive cloak that covered up sin and swept the unbeliever under 
its protection. Rather, faith was a decisive act of the will, brought 
to fruition through passionate inwardness. 
Much of S.K. 's category of the individual may be regarded 
as positive, for it has swung the pendulum away from an easy, nominal 
7s~ren Kierkegaard, S~ren Kierkegaard's Journals and Papers 
ed. and trans. H.V. & E.H. Hong (Bloomington: Indiana University 
Press, 1970), Vol. 2, p. 399. 
8Ibid., Vol. 1, (1967) p. 414. 
91. 
Christianity that made no difference in the life of the believer. 
The pendulum swung towards the responsible individual decision by 
which one becomes a Christian and lives as a Christian: a dramatic 
transformation in the life of the believer. 9 
2. Kierkegaarddeveloped the response of faith as the neces-
sary or essential response of the believer. He offered Abraham of 
the Old Testament as the prime example of faith and dubbed him the 
"Knight of Faith." The response of the believer prior to S.K. was 
no response at a 11. The church assumed the responsi bi 1 i ty for the 
individual, thereby making the individual response of faith completely 
unnecessary. 
Ki erkegaard was right in asserting that without a persona 1 
response of faith, the individual is not in possession of true Chris-
tianity. The real contribution of Kierkegaard at this point was his 
insistance upon the existential nature of faith. The book of James 
declared that faith without works is dead. Kierkegaard made it clear 
that this was so. Faith that lay outside of the individual ceased 
to be faith, for faith found its expression through the life 
activities of the believer. Faith, to be regarded as faith, must be 
part of the believers existential situation, else it is useless. 
Faith, rather than virtue as stated by Kierkegaard, was indeed 
the opposite of sin. Sin is the cause of the broken relationship 
between man and God. The activities of virtue, while good and 
9
rt is true that Kierkegaard has been accused of swinging the 
pendulum too far in favor of the individual. This question will be 
addressed first under Yes item #3 - Truth is Subjectivity. It will 
also be addressed underlmJ item #1 - Exaggerated individualism. 
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commendable, are important in reconciling man to God. Reconciliation 
is possible only through faith for "by grace are you saved through 
faith." (Ephesians 2:8). 
Because of his ins i stance in this regard Ki erkegaard wrested 
the legalistic notion that "virtue gains righteousness" from it's 
moorings and set decisive faith in it's place. Kierkegaard pointed 
out that the believer's response must be one of faith in order to be 
a believer. 
3. One of Kiekegaard's major contributions to thought has 
been in regard to his primary thesis, "truth is subjectivity." While 
one may disagree with some of Kierkegaard's conclusions, he has 
clearly pointed out the differences between the objective and sub-
jective. 
Kierkegaard is right when he emphasizes the subjective nature 
of religious knowledge. While we may not go all the way with Kier-
kegaard, we must understand that there is a place in our understanding 
of God where objective knowledge drops off and subjective faith brings 
one into relationship with God. Contemporary Christianity seems to 
feel an obligation to defend the elements of faith in Christianity 
in an objective fashion to a society which worships science and 
deplores the paradoxical, the mysterious. However, as S.K. has so ably 
pointed out, the objective proof for God's existence can only end in 
approximation. The final step must be subjective through faith. 
Therefore, at least in this sense, truth is subjectivity. 
Because, for Kierkegaard, truth is subjectivity, he has been 
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accused of leading theology into radical subjectivity and advocating 
irrationalism. That Kierkegaard's position can lead to these things 
is absolutely true. That Kierkegaard himself was guilty of these is 
doubtful. In Book One of the Postscript S.K. made clear that 
religious truth can be known objectively but that it is totally in-
adequate. True Christianity moves much further, demanding that the 
believer appropriate the truths for himself and live in relation to 
those truths. 
Kierkegaard does have irrational elements in his thought. 
However, this is not because of his dislike for reason. He was fully 
aware of the capabi 1 iti es of human reason and appreciated reason's 
abilities. His concern was with the 1 imits of human reason. The 
pretentions of the rationalists caused him to be aware of the limits 
of reason and the need to avoid the pride of i nte 11 ect. Rea 1 under-
standing is that which understands there are things in the world that 
defy rational explanation. Paradox exists only for the existing 
individual, but in God "the eternal essential truth is by no means 
in itself a paradox." 10 
C. No 
1. While one of the great contributions of Kierkegaard was 
the emphasis upon the individual in the face of the mass, an exag-
gerated individualism began to emerge. The individual was a solitary 
10
s0ren Kierkegaard, Postscript, op. cit., p. 183. 
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individual who was to stand alone before God. 
This individualism is too extreme for it does not take into 
account the doctrine of the church, the uni versa 1 priest hood of a 11 
believers etc. One reads Kierkegaard in vain to discover any dis-
cussion of corporate worship, Christian fellowship, discipleship of 
the new believer by the body, or the Church as the body of Christ as 
described in Ephesians. As Ki erkegaard admitted, man is a soci a 1 
creature. Instead of isolating oneself, involvement with others is 
the Christian ideal. One need not become part of the mass to involve 
himself with others. Individualism may be maintained despite the 
efforts of the mass because one is in true relationship with God. 
The fulfillment of Matthew 28:19-20 cannot come about in isolation. 
Exaggerated individualism also altered S.K. 's perception of 
reality. While he did accept some objective reality it was always 
inferior to subjective reality. The unimportance of objective reality 
resulted in the symbolic Christianity of Schwietzer, Bultmann and 
others. Subjective reality must be dependent upon the foundation of 
objective rea 1 i ty. If this is not so then Christ's death upon the 
cross need not have really happened so long as we have the symbol of 
his death within Christian theology - a house does not need a 
foundation so 1 ong as we have the symbo 1 of a foundation within our 
being. 
Kierkegaard's inwardness distorted reality by causing the 
elements of reality to be stretched out of proportion. S.K. 's inward 
reflections upon even the most minuscule reactions of Regine 
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frequently resulted in unrealistic assumptions concerning motives and 
intentions. The reality that is only inward is inadequate. The 
subjective and objective should serve each other, establishing a 
creative tension between the two, resulting in a balanced perception 
or reality. Reality becomes existentially meaningful but is not dis-
torted beyond recognition. 
2. Kierkegaard's ethical theory suggested a teleological sus-
pension of the ethical as the "Knight of faith's" response to the 
absolute or God. Teleological suspension of the ethical was intended 
to accentuate the abso 1 uteness of God but instead reduced God the 
absolute, to god the relative. 
Ki erkegaard regarded Abraham as the true "Knight of faith." 
When Abraham willingly intended to kill his own son, he was acting 
in what Kierkegaard called the "teleological suspension of the 
ethi ca 1." However, if God is abso 1 ute as Ki erkegaard admitted, then 
God is also perfect. He established his ethical laws as the ethical 
absolute by which to govern man. While God may be above his own law, 
his law is not inadequate for man, for he does not create or establish 
inadequate things, only man's willful perversion can destroy the per-
fect. Therefore, for God to suspend His own ethical laws demandsthat 
God admit to His own inadequacy and renege on his established law and 
temporarily estab 1 ish a new 1 aw dependent upon the human, tempera 1 
situation. Therefore God was subservient to His own creation, and 
even the absolute became relative. 
Teleological suspension of the ethical has left the door open 
for situation ethics. All the standards by which one measures the 
96. 
rightness or wrongness are relative. As Kierkegaard suggested, one 
may be in the truth and yet be related to an untruth. In this sort 
of ethi ca 1 re 1 at i vity one is not so concerned with the what of a 
decision but rather the how of a decision. Did the decision to do 
a particular thing come about through passionate inwardness involving 
the whole being? - if so, then one is in the truth. 
While one should be existentially involved with a decision, 
the subjective process of decision should be consistent with the 
objective reality of the decision to determine the wrong or right. 
When an ethical law or absolute is violated then situation alone 
determines the ethical decision governed by a relative interpretation 
of the law of love. 
3. Kierkegaard had manybrilliant insights on the subject of 
faith, already alluded to. However, he was content with a most in-
adequate relation betw~en faith and objective/public evidences for the 
Christian religion. He asserted that faith is based on risks and the 
more risks the more faith one is exercising. Faith is therefore 
founded not in the objective reality of the object of faith - God, but 
instead desires to heighten the risk or absurdity of the object of 
faith, - God, who is the absolute paradox. 
If we use this reasoning then the imagination can surely con-
jure something up besides the absolute paradox, the incarnation, which 
demands more risk. Perhaps we should assert that Christ possessed two 
heads and flew airplanes. This would indeed increase the absurdity 
and thus the risk of faith, but it is preposterous and is unbelievable 
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because it is contrary to the sufficiency of the evidences. 
The Christi an may respond passionately with faith regarding 
the e 1 ement of Christianity but this does not raise the sense of 
certainty. The Christian should believe passionately but the belief 
is founded in the sufficiency of the evidences for the Christi an 
faith. The act of living a Christian life is existential proof that 
one is experiencing a state of certainty. The passion of faith is 
the result of observing the sufficiency of the evidences and the 
object of faith. 
Fortunately Kierkegaard has contributed much more to the life 
of faith than he has detracted from it. He has called man to a type 
of existence that few have the courage upon which to embark. Ki er-
kegaard knew that the easy was not worth having. 
Ki erkegaard was a genius in his ability to bring man 
closer to God, and God closer to man. His guiding rule was 
that an absolute devotion should be given to an absolute 
telos, and a relative devotion to a relative telos. With the 
help of this rule, Kierkegaard succeeded in defining an 
existential approach to the existing individual. This 
approach is exciting, to say the least.ll 
11 carnell, E.J., The Burden of S0ren Kierkegard (Grand Rapids: 
1965) ' p. 172. 
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